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ABSTRACT: This article examines the role of the corporate vehicle in the creation of
social costs. The article identifies some of the political commitments and philosophies
behind the differing notions of corporations. Social costs are those activities which result
from business activity and cause uncompensated harm to society. The founding
contribution to the law and economics discussion by Ronald Coase is given a thorough
treatment. The paper next, turns to the dominant explanation of corporate structure,
namely the law and economics model developed expounded by Easterbrook and Fischel.
It then applies the theoretical discussion in a case study of the world’s largest
corporation, WAL-MART, Inc. It next examines the relation of social costs and corporate
legal structure. It concludes with some recommendations for corporate reform.
1) INTRODUCTION
Social costs of business activity have been a concern of economists, politicians, lawyers,
business people and society at large for decades. Through the passage of time, our
awareness of the nature, extent or dimensions, and incremental and accumulating impact
of social costs has increased dramatically. Various approaches to the problem have been
suggested from governmental regulation, to cessation of activities, to free markets.
Regardless of one’s underlying commitments, it cannot be denied that with respect to the
most significant social cost—the threatened habitability of the planet—the current
approaches are failing.1 Yet despite our knowledge of the impending disaster and its
causes, to date there has been very limited success in coordinating efforts address it.2
From this failure, it may be argued that indeed there may be other social costs which have
yet to be clearly identified which are, nevertheless, accumulating and possibly with
significant consequences.

1

UNEP Climate Change makes it clear that there is indeed a climate change problem caused by human
activities and that the consequences could be drastic. http://climatechange.unep.net/
2
The most recent failure of coordination has been the failure of the United States of America and Australia
to sign the Convention and Kyoto Protocol. See latest information on this matter at
http://unfccc.int/resource/convkp.html For a discussion of the problem as a coordination problem, see
Katharina Holzinger, “Aggregation Technology of Common Goods and its Strategic Consequences: Global
Warming, Biodiversity and Siting Conflicts,” 1 EUROPEAN J. OF POLITICAL RESEARCH 40 (2001)..
Ecological economists has been making an effort to do address environmental problems resulting from
perspectives promoted by their discipline. For a helpful introduction to ecological economics and its
relation to law, see Douglas Kysar, “Sustainability, Distribution and the Macroecnomic Analysis of Law,”
43 B.C.L. REV. 1 (2001).
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This study considers some of these social costs which at present are only poorly
identified and not much studied. Social costs are the negative by-products of commercial
activity not paid for by the beneficiaries of the activity. Instead, these negative byproducts or “costs” are borne by the rest of society—hence, “social costs.” They are the
costs to others or society at large of the conduct of business. As will be discussed, social
costs often involve coordination problems—problems that can only be solved by people
coordinating their efforts rather than simply acting as individuals seeking their own
interests. Obviously, the previously mentioned matter of climate change is one such
matter. Another less obvious one arises from business activity, and particularly through
the corporate vehicle.
In considering corporations in society, one must have an idea of the nature of the
corporation, ideas about the nature of society, and the role of law, business, people and
corporations in the composition and functioning of society. From a corporate law
perspective, one needs to consider who counts as a member of the corporation: whether it
be shareholders, directors, managers, employees and other suppliers, or possibly even
including society at large. Corporate law must consider the coordination of all of these
elements of society and the costs imposed on society. The focus of this article is the
social cost—i.e. the cost to the people who make up society—of the activity of large
corporations. In order to create an informed context for the discussion, all of these issues
will have to be addressed.
To avoid creating an argument based on mere speculation about social costs and
corporations, the second part of this study will be a case study of Wal-Mart. The study
will attempt to answer the question: Are there significant social costs which are poorly
identified and not well studied associated with large corporations? This question is
becoming increasingly important as a consequence of globalization, which is driven
largely by corporations and which has significantly increased corporate power.
Multinational corporations and their investors have been implicated in the inhumane and
devastating policies known as Structural Adjustment Programs promoted by the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the manifestly unfair trade policies of the
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World Trade Organization.3 The great power of these corporations is not being used for
the betterment of society,4 and so it is incumbent upon scholars to study and consider
carefully the activities of these members of society.
This study will examine critically theories of the corporation, then the views and theories
of Ronald Coase, a leading economist and thinker on social costs. Next, it will turn to a
critical review of law and economics analysis of corporate law. This law and economics
perspective will be used since its descriptive power, particularly in corporate law, is
widely accepted.5 In order to understand the law and economics perspective, it will be
necessary to analyse its presuppositions, and then see how these approaches produce
outcomes consistent with their presuppositions. Finally, it will apply this critical analysis
to the activities of the specific business that serves as the case study, Wal-Mart, by
identifying the social costs, and determine what, if any, relation there is between these
social costs and the corporate vehicle-corporate law.
The study has identified a number of poorly considered social costs created by Wal-Mart.
Furthermore, for various reasons, it will be shown that these social costs tend to fall
outside of the traditional law and economics paradigm, and so fail to be considered as
matters of corporate law. Finally, the study will conclude with some suggestions for both
further law reform and directions for future study.

3
JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002) is a thorough-going and stinging
indictment of the IMF and to a lesser degree of the World Bank, of which Stiglitz himself served as chief
economist. Stiglitz comments are mostly restricted to the investors. The investors, however, are those
who invest on behalf of corporations in hedge funds, futures and options to limit the exposure of their
corporate sponsors. STIGLITZ 128-130, and NOAM CHOMSKY, PROFIT OVER PEOPLE: NEOLIBERALISM AND
GLOBAL ORDER, (1999) discusses the collusion if not control exercised by international financial interests
and multinational corporations over the IMF and World Bank as part of the Washington Consensus, 19-20.
Further he discusses the WTO as charged with the task of exporting American values. 65-72.
4
Much of Chomsky’s work is a sweeping review and analysis of the involvement of corporations in the
political system of the United States of America. Chomsky shows how the corporations have corrupted
government and subverted democratic processes to serve their own interests. See for example, 38-39, 61
and the trend he refers to as the “corporatization of America.” 132. See as an other example, the role of
MNC’s in thwarting private enterprise in Singapore, in Tan Yock Lin, Legal Change and Commercial Law
in Singapore, in EAST ASIA—HUMAN RIGHTS, NATION – BUILDING, TRADE, (1999) ALICE TAY, ED., 29.
5
Gary Minda, “The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980’s” 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (1989)
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The study is limited to the discussion of a single case. Because of the innovative nature
of the study, there is limited data available for broader study. In addition, at this stage in
the research, it is the author’s opinion that a deeper study, identifying more specifically,
and identifying a higher quantity social costs is more important or helpful than a broader
more general discussion. Accordingly, the generalizations which can be made from this
study are limited. It does not purport to be suitable to all jurisdictions, nor to all
corporate models, nor to all industries. It is the study of a specific multinational retail
sales corporation, which happens to be the largest corporation in the world.6

2) HOW TO READ THIS ARTICLE: DIMENSIONS OF THE DISCUSSION
At the outset, I believe it is necessary to identify the main belief sets forming the
backdrop for this discussion. In his fascinating and comprehensive analysis of academic
legal debate, Professor Gerald Wetlaufer observes that, “conversations and arguments are
less easily understood, less easily learned, less productive, less conclusive, and
sometimes less civil than we might think it reasonable to expect.”7 He comments, “We
hear a great many arguments in which it seems that people ought to be convincing one
another but, in fact, are not. We see arguments that fail to persuade, disagreements that
never end, and, all too often, partisans who neither understand nor respect their
adversary's positions.”8 Few of those engaged in the dialogue would disagree with this
comment; hence, his analysis of the underlying philosophical commitments which are the
cause of this inability to communicate within the academic legal community are worth
identifying, for improving an understanding of the intractability of the advocates of the
various positions presented in this article.
Wetlaufer identifies a “Master Paradigm” in which most legal dialogue is conducted.
That paradigm is liberalism—views of individualism, autonomy, freedom, and that the
6

Details discussed in detail in Part 6.
G. Wetlaufer, “Systems Of Belief In Modern American Law: A View From Century's End” 49 AM. U.L.
REV. 1 2 (1999)
8
Id, at 2.
7
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role of the state is the protection of the individual and those freedoms. This view
includes commitments to: rights discourse, a particular version of rule of Law, notion
that public and private spheres are distinguishable realities, and that state action is
appropriate only in the public sphere.9 Any discussion which does not bow to these
primary commitments is simply dismissed. Within this larger paradigm, there are two
main schools of thought that have relevance to this discussion. They are the Legal
Realists and their most important successors, the Law and Economics scholars, and the
Legal Positivists. Whereas the Legal Realists see law as nothing more than the
conventions of a society, changeable, measurable, instrumental in achieving specified
objectives, having no particular commitment to method, the Legal Positivists see law as
an objective, independent first principle. More contentiously, at least in the strong
version, the Legal Realist Law and Economics scholars see all value and morals as
nothing more than the cash amount a person is willing and able to pay.10 Furthermore,
Law and Economics, at least the neo-classicist scholars view justice as the mere
maximization of aggregate wealth.11 Any notion of redistribution or movement of costs
other than as placed by the market is inefficient diminution of wealth maximization.12
Legal Positivists, by way of contrast, view law as an independent endeavour, an
independent discipline with its own set of norms, methods of analysis and values. Legal
Positivism carries with it commitments to philosophical positivism, utilitarianism, and
classical liberalism.13 As well, it holds to notions of justice as fairness, Aristotelian
notions of corrective and distributive justice, and practical reason.14 It sees moral
knowledge as both possible and objective.
The law and economics scholars clearly belong to the Legal Realist tradition and clash
with the Legal Postivists. Before coming to any conclusion concerning the matters
9

Id, at 9.
Posner, cited in Wetlaufer, supra n. 7 41 n. 144. For criticism of Posner’s views on this matter, see
Whitney Cunningham, “Testing Posner’s Strong Theory of Wealth Maximization” 81 GEO. L. R. 141.
(1992)
11
Id, at 38.
12
Wetlaufer, supra n. 7 38.
13
Id, at 46.
14
Id, at 47.
10
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discussed in this article, it is important to consider the validities of each frame of
reference, regardless of which set of a prioi commitments one finds oneself drawn to. As
is most often the case in such debates, neither has a corner on the truth and so it behoves
all disputants to consider the contribution of the other.
Wetlaufer proceeds to identify ten dimensions of prior commitments which set the legal
debate into different directions. These dimensions are:
(1) the fairness and legitimacy of the existing order;
(2) prime values and projects (e.g. law is to: facilitate wealth maximization, creation
of a just society, or ensure order);
(3) focus and center of attention;
(4) human nature and social existence;
(5) the nature and consequences of language;
(6) the nature of knowledge and the possibilities of reason and objectivity;
(7) the relationship between law and other disciplines;
(8) interpretive strategies and forms of argument;
(9) the possibility of the rule of law; and
(10) the consequences of speaking against either of the above.15
One’s various commitments along the above ten dimensions primarily determines what
one finds, and what one finds acceptable among various possible outcomes.
a) Ten Dimensions and the Law and Economics Discussion
Among the commitments Wetlaufer discusses, we can identify the following dimensions
as critical to this discussion: (1) the fairness and legitimacy of the existing order; (2)
prime values and projects; (3) focus and center of attention; and (4) human nature and
15

Id, at 60
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social existence. As will be discussed in more depth later in this article—concerning the
value assumptions of the law and economics movement—the law and economics
discussion is decidedly in favour of the status quo, see efficiency and wealth
maximization as the prime value and project, is focused on individual wealth and rights,
and denies the existence of any such thing as society. As a discipline, law and
economics’ commitment to neo-classical economics, incorporates by default the
assumptions of neo-classical economics.16 One of the hallmarks of neo-classical
economics is its commitment to radical individualism. Individuals are the only legitimate
subject of study as society is noting more than a collection of individuals.17

16

Charles Pouncy, “Economic Justice and Economic Theory: Limiting the Reach of Neoclassical Ideology”
14 J. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 11 (2002), See also Cunningham, supra n. 10. See Daniel Hausman, The inexact
and separate discipline of economics, (1996).
17
Pouncy id.
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3) CORPORATIONS
To understand the corporation, its role in society and the problem associated with
controlling its social costs, there needs to be a brief discussion of the nature of the
corporation and corporate theory. The nature of the corporation can be explained by a
review of some of its historical developments, and a brief examination of some of its
models.18
In its early form, the joint-stockholder corporation would have passed liability for social
costs onto the shareholders. This potential passing of liability to shareholders may have
had a significant impact on corporate behaviour and subsequent corporate development if
tort law had been more mature and social costs more clearly identified. Interestingly, it
should not be supposed that social costs were invisible. Indeed there were high rates of
worker injury and death; the courts, however, placed no liability on the corporate owners
for such injury.19 Society had to bear these costs for the benefit of industrialization, which
benefit was a benefit primarily to the entitled classes. As a theory popular in the late 19th
and early to mid-20th century, the main social costs identified were smoke and other
visible industrial atmospheric discharges which the law deals with as a matter of mere
nuisances between neighbours.20
18

The issues of corporations and corporate models are discussed in Benedict Sheehy, “Scrooge – The
Reluctant Stakeholder: Theoretical Problems in The Shareholder-Stakeholder Debate.” Forthcoming: 12 U.
OF MIAMI BUS. L. R. (2004) and Benedict Sheehy, “The Importance of Corporate Models: Economic And
Jurisprudential Values And The Future Of Corporate Law.” 2(3) DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L. J. (2004)
(Forthcoming). For a masterful analysis of the history of corporate models and a critical consideration of
the claims to innovative insights made by neo-classical corporate law and economics study see William
Bratton, “The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History,” 1 STANFORD LAW
REV. 1471-527 (1989), in THE LAW OF THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: SELECTED ESSAYS, SALLY WHEELER
ED., OXFORD READINGS IN SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES (1994) 117-179.
19
Hutchinson v. York Newcastle Rly (185) 5 Exch. 343
20
See cases cited by Coase “"The Problem of Social Costs," 1 J. OF LAW AND ECON., 1
(1960). This view of atmospheric pollution is still evident in international atmospheric
litigation such as between the USA and Canada concerning acid rain, and other
contaminants. United States vs. Canada, Arbitral Tribunal, Montreal 16 April 1938 and 11
March 1941; United Nations Reports of International Arbitral Awards 3 (1947) 1905;
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (1939) 182, and 35 (1941) 716. The issue
of externalities, coordination and economic analysis in a transboundary problem is given an
in depth treatment in Franz Xavier Perrez “The Efficiency Of Cooperation: A Functional
Analysis Of Sovereignty,” 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 515. 527-42 (1998)
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a) Concession Theories
Concession theorists note that the corporation owes its existence to a governmental
concession. In the beginning, governments delegated and granted trading rights to
corporations.21 Corporations were permitted to carry on only those activities authorized
in the concession granted by the government. The limits of the concession were set out
in the articles of incorporation or constitution of the corporation. Given this
concessionary nature of the corporation, the government retained certain rights
concerning the governance and operation of the corporation.

22

The roots of this view are in the corporation’s history. In the concessionaire view, the
corporation is an entity different and separate from the shareholder/ investors. It is often
referred to as the legal fiction or corporate personality theory. In its essence, this model
focuses on such characteristics as the corporation’s legal identity, independent of the
parties involved in either management, investors, or employees. It also highlights the
corporation’s legal rights and responsibilities as a legal person who can sue in its own
right and be sued, pay taxes, and otherwise subject, independently of its members, to the
laws of society.23 In this view, the corporation is a concession granted by the government
to a group of would be investors.24 As a concession from the government, the
corporation continues to be subject to the government’s will. If one accepts a
concessionaire view of the corporation, it is easier to see the argument for stakeholder
involvement or at least for government regulation such as limiting social costs such as
21

JANET DINE, THE GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE GROUPS, (2001), 21
An interesting, peculiarly Australian view which may be viewed as an offshoot of the conscessionaire
theory is “constitutionalism.” As argued by Australian corporate law scholar, Stephen Bottomley,
“[corporations] themselves are systems in which power and authority, rights and obligations, duties and
expectation, benefits and disadvantages, are allocated and exercised…. Each company is a body politic…”
Stephen Bottomley, “From Contractualism to Constitutionalism: A Framework for Corporate
Governance” 19 SYDNEY L. REV. 277. Dine observes that the concessionaire view is susceptible to the
criticism that the corporation is no more than a mere fiction. If it is not made up of the solid, physical
shareholders, acting in concert to create a common enterprise, the corporation has no more substance than a
mere idea. Further, while it may explain the foundation of the corporation, concession theory fails as an
operational theory. It does not explain by whom or how the corporation is to be run. Nor yet does it set
any limits on state involvement. Indeed a pure concession view allows the corporation to be a mere
instrument of the state. Dine, id, 24.
23
David Millon, "Theories of the Corporation," DUKE L.J. 201(1990).
22
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green house gas emissions permitted to a particular corporate entity. As a governmental
concession, the corporation owes duties back to the government. This obligation,
however, does not extend automatically, beyond government into a general duty to
society.25 The concessionaire model of the corporation in the historical context allows
social costs as unfortunate consequences to be borne by society for the benefit of the
investor.
i) Political entity
In a variation of the concession theory, some corporate theorists focus on the
corporation’s political character. Its political characteristics are its constitutional
foundation setting up internal control structures similar to governments, its power, its
decision making processes, the need for managers to balance competing interests, and
such broader concerns as implied by the Corporate Governance movement. Some
scholars draw in further political implications from this model such as the democratic
principle that those effected by decisions should have voice.
Social costs in this model are viewed much as social costs in all political decision
making. They are part of the society. The issue in corporate law, of course, is who
makes this “corporation’s society”? Is it investors and directors only, or does it include
employees and other suppliers, or society at large. Perhaps the most important benefit of
the model is the acknowledgement of the corporation as a powerful, political entity.
Although currently out of fashion because of its connection to the concession theory, 26 it
may yet have some life.27
ii) Communitarian

24

Gregory Mark, "Some Observations on Writing the Legal History of the Corporation in the Age of
Theory," in LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL (ED.), PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 67, 68-69 (1995).
25
DINE, supra n. 21, at 21
26
Jennifer Hill, “Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder,” 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 39 56 (2000).
27
See, for example, ANDREW FRASER, REINVENTING ARISTOCRACY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMATION
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, (1998).
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These views—concessionaire and political views—are subsumed in the communitarian
model of the corporation.28 Communitarians argue that the corporation is a community,
political entity, granted a separate identity by the government, participating in society at
large with its own independent rights, privileges, duties and obligations. Accordingly, it
should be responsible for its social costs, just as every other rights bearer in society.
b) Contractarian Theories29
Contractarians view the corporation as a form of contract between its members. This
theory posits the corporation as a private matter between individuals and accordingly,
places no additional duty on the corporation than that which exists on each, separate
individual involved in the corporation. The corporation, as nothing more than a
collection of individuals, is a private matter and as such should be subject to the least
possible government interference.
The roots of this theory go back historically to an era when the characteristics of the
modern corporation—particularly, limited liability—had not been created. This model of
the corporation comes from corporate origins as the joint-stockholder company. In that
model, the corporation is simply another partnership-like arrangement in which the
shareholders are essentially owners, liable for the debts of the company.30 The corporate
vehicle is a convenient private financial arrangement,31 which allows entrepreneurs to
invest jointly in enterprises too large or too risky to undertake on a single investor basis.
This model is often called the aggregate model and in it, the directors are the agents of
their principals, the shareholders. It is discussed primarily as the aggregate model,
meaning that the corporation is nothing more than the aggregate of the individual
members.
28

LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL ED., PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (1995).
There are other approaches to the analysis of corporations as voluntary collectives. See
for example Paula J. Dalley “To Whom It May Concern: Fiduciary Duties And Business
Associations” 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 515 45 (2001).
30
See, for example, Margaret Jane Radin, "The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality," 32 COLUM. L.
REV. 643 (1972).
31
See Morton Horwitz, "Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory," 88 W. VA. L. REV.
173, 204 (1985); D. Gordon Smith, "The Shareholder Primacy Norm," 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 302-03 (1998).
The aggregate theory of the corporation was seen as hostile to both state regulation and to the burgeoning
management corporation. See Bratton, supra n. 18, at 1471, 1489.
29
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The economic contractarian model, as distinguished from the legal contractarian model
traces its origins at least as far back as the economist Ronald Coase.32 Coase first
proposed that the corporation is a type of firm.33 By describing the corporation as a firm,
Coase means that this type of organization operates as a more efficient means of
production than the market, and it does this, he claims, by grouping people and inputs
together, combining tasks in one enterprise and thereby lowering transaction costs.34 In
this model, there is a direct connection and related accountability between the contracting
parties: the capital provider-shareholders and the managers. As economist Milton
Friedman has famously put it “He [an executive] has a direct responsibility to his
employers. That responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance to their desire…
to make as much money as possible.”35
Contractarians reject the notion of the corporation being a body independent of the
shareholders and in fact reject the very idea of corporation. It is merely a nexus of
contracts. Logically, it cannot have obligations distinct from the obligations of its
individual members. Therefore, the notion of corporate social responsibility—as distinct
from the responsibilities of the individual shareholders—is a non-sequitor. It is simply a
logical contradiction.
In the contractarian view, as Millon explains it:
state corporate law provides the terms of the contract by which shareholders
purchase management's undivided loyalty to their welfare… to the extent that
32

Bratton makes the argument that this view of the corporations goes back to the nineteenth century. Id.
Coase supra n. 20. But see, Bratton id.
34
Coase op. cit discussed as the source of the 1980’s nexus of contracts theorists in Millon, supra n. 23, at
229-232. Note Joo’s discussion of the difference between economists’ understanding of contracts and legal
understanding contracts, in Thomas W. Joo “Corporations Theory And Corporate Governance
Law: Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor in Corporations Law,” 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 779,
789-804. This issue for economic contractarians is: How the owner-shareholder principal can control and
limit the manager-agent sufficiently to minimize “managerial opportunism” or “agency costs”. They find
answers in the markets for capital, corporate control and management skill, and secondarily in the body of
corporate law. Bottomley, supra n. 22, at 285-287. The issue first was given its modern analysis by Berle
and Means.
35
Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
1970, at SM17.
33
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management's pursuit of shareholder welfare threatens nonshareholder interests,
workers, creditors, and other affected nonshareholders are free to bargain with
shareholders (through their agents) for whatever protections they are willing to
pay for. This view assumes that feasible (that is, not excessively costly)
contracting strategies exist for correction of the harmful external effects of
shareholder/management activity and, perhaps, that such effects are relatively
uncommon.36
Social costs, therefore, are simply those things that parties not party to the corporate
contract have failed to bargain for. Many advocates of this view fail to recognize that
markets are inevitably incomplete, do not exist for many social costs, and accordingly,
cannot be considered an appropriate or sufficient solution to social costs. 37
Social costs in this model are part and parcel of this group’s business activities, and as
such, those who complain about them should be subject to the same constraints and
bargaining positions as any other member of society, including those contracting together
forming the corporate contract. The core contractors are the shareholders and thus their
interests should be the focus of corporate concern. This focus leads to the related
contractarian model known as the shareholder primacy model.

c) Criticisms of the Models
The contractarian model has number of shortcomings. Critically, it fails to explain the
most significant feature of the corporation: that is to say it does not account for limited
liability.38 Nor do contractarian models adequately address other corporate rights such as

36

David Millon “New Directions In Corporate Law Communitarians, Contractarians, And The Crisis In
Corporate Law,” 50 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1379 (1993).
37
B. Greenwald and J.E. Stiglitz “Externalities in Economics with Imperfect Information and Incomplete
Markets” 101 (2) QUARTERLY J. OF ECONOMICS, 229-64 (1986). Social costs are defined by some
commentators as those things for which no market exists. See discusison of Section 4 Costs below.
38
Dine notes the state involvement in creating the limited liability aspect of corporations. This grant of
limited liability is what made corporations such an attractive option for conducting business (Eley v.
Positive Government Life Assurance (1876) 1 ExD 88,) and essentially what gave rise to their dominance in
commerce. supra n. 19, at 4. The explanation that this would eventually have been contracted for,
according to Dine, is not supported by the facts. One solution proposed by scholar Michael Whincup,
“Inequitable Incorporation--The Abuse of a Privilege”, 2 COMPANY LAW 158, 158-60 (1981). The English
law still rests on the decision of the House of Lords in Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. 75 L.T.R. 426 (1897).
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the right to hold property and the right to freedom of expression, which rights are held by
the corporation independently of its members.
An important aspect of some social costs, as we shall see, is that they arise precisely
because of inabilities to contract. Markets will always be incomplete, and accordingly, to
suggest that social costs are a mere problem of contracting suggests a failure to
understand the nature of the problem (to address social costs in the market would require
new types of property to be created and distributed) and the nature of markets as
incomplete along with other market failures.
The univocal focus on efficiency39 supported by contractarian models brings the question
of why efficiency should be set as the prime value. As Millon observes:
References to efficiency simply beg the underlying question of why efficiency
should provide the sole normative criterion. As a society we have not embraced
the market as a totalizing model for the definition of rights and responsibilities.40
Furthermore, this focus on the bottom line always creates a strong incentive to externalize
costs, increase production, and thereby increase profit.41 As Horrigan observes:
financially based shareholder focus… allows corporations to externalize the costs
of maximizing stock prices onto everyone except the stockholders’ the includes
employees, the environment, consumers, suppliers and the community at large.42
Contractarians are focused on internal corporate activity and apply a cost-benefit analysis
to a relatively narrow range of items that are more susceptible to numeric measurement.

39

Contractarians’ efficiency focus follows closely on the economists’ view that creating wealth is the sole
objective of corporate activity. Any increase in wealth is a social benefit, and permits turning a blind eye to
the distribution of that wealth or the costs of producing that wealth.
40
Millon, supra n. 36, 1386.
41
See Kaldor-Hicks theory discussed Dine, supra n. 21, 9 and ROBIN MALLOY LAW AND MARKET
ECONOMY, (2000) 154-155.
42
Brian Horrigan, “Fault Lines In the Intersection between Corporate Governance and Social
Responsibility,” 25 UNSW L.J. 515 (2002) 550.
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Critics of the concessionaire model, such as Easterbrook and Fischel, note that people
will choose to associate in manners suitable to their interests, regardless of government
recognition. Accordingly, they claim that such things as limited liability would have
been contracted for had the government not granted it through legislation. Further,
concessionaire critics point to the non-existence or fictional nature of the “body” of the
corporation. Where is the “concession,” or “community” apart from the freely
contracting members? To have anything more or other than the individuals is non-sense,
in the most literal sense of the term.
Ultimately, we are left with Hart’s observation: “a survey of competing theories of ‘the
corporation’ leaves one to conclude that none has survived intact.”43
d) The Ideological Divide
Underlying this war of models is a much deeper ideological conflict. Contractarian
advocates start from the idea that people are isolated autonomous rights bearers.
Included among their sui generis rights is the right to decide how to dispose of their
property rights and in the case of the corporation, their property rights as shareholders.
They view the corporation as a nexus of contracts between private individuals in which
the government has no business.
Communitarian advocates, by way of contrast, view the individual as set in a context, and
that context is a social context. They view liberty as having positive duties. From their
perspective: “Liberty is empty without taking into account those primary needs upon
which adequate conceptions of individual dignity and human flourishing depend.”44
They view the corporation as a social body, as a member of society, and a significant
member at that. They emphasize the power and effects of corporations in society. In
addition, communitarians are, in Millon’s words, “skeptical about the practical efficacy

43

Quoted in Eric Orts, “The Complexity And Legitimacy Of Corporate Law” (1993) 50 WASH & LEE L.
REV. 1565, 1570.
44
Millon supra n. 36, 1382-3.
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of contract as a mechanism by which nonshareholders can protect themselves ex ante
from… harmful effects.”45
As Millon frames the debate “what does set communitarians apart from contractarians is
the communitarians' strong skepticism toward the baseline presumption that contract
alone should specify the terms of corporate governance relationships.”46 At a
fundamental ideological level, contractarians and communitarians are divided.
Contractarians believe that justice is manifest in the status quo and the only legitimate
interests are those bargained for. : “For communitarians,’ as Millon puts it “justice does
not require endorsement of the existing distribution of wealth and bargaining capability.
They seek instead to reform corporate law so as to foster individual dignity and promote
societal welfare.”47 Such deep ideological debates are not about to be settled on the basis
of superiority of models.48
The importance of how one understands the corporation should not be underestimated.49
If one views it as a government franchise, the government has a right to control it, and
society has a right to demand certain behaviours of it, including internalizing social costs.
If, however, one views the corporation as a mere official recognition of a spontaneously
occurring organization of individuals, there is no justification for governmental
interference. The simple fact that some individuals have decided to come together to
conduct business does not suddenly or automatically give the government the right to
interfere in the private affairs of its citizens, and certainly to placing additional
obligations on the individuals who form the corporate contract.

45

Id 1380
Id 1381
47
Id 1386. In Millon’s review of Chayes’s theories, he summarizes the issue at a personal level: “Having
induced nonshareholders to rely on legitimate expectations of fair dealing, shareholders therefore may
forfeit the right to insist on contract terms guaranteeing profits at the expense of others.” David Millon,
“The Ambiguous Significance Of Corporate Personhood: Working Paper No. 01-6 January 2001
Washington & Lee Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, 23.
48
See Wetlaufer, discussed supra n. 7.
49
See Sheehy, supra n. 18.
46
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Perhaps most significantly, regardless of the model one accepts or what view one takes of
the corporation, any political positivist analysis makes obvious the observation that
corporations have grown in terms of their power. Their economic might and control over
resources is astounding. No less than fifty of the world’s largest one hundred economies
are corporate bodies, and studies indicate that the control of these bodies tends to be
concentrated in the hands of a very small number of people.50

e) Shareholder primacy
The model of the corporation in vogue at the present is a variant of the contractarian
model, known to business scholars as the shareholder primacy or profit maximization
model.51 This view is that the corporation’s objective or raison d’etre is to produce the
greatest profit. Although various reason are advanced as to why shareholders of all the
corporation’s suppliers should be privileged above all others, none is particularly
convincing, at least in larger corporations.52 In order to do so, it must have high revenues
and low costs. In other words, it must be efficient. This use of the term efficiency is
important and should be distinguished from the similar but different use of the term
efficiency as used by economists. To economists efficiency means making the most

50

For a listing of the world’s 100 largest economies in 2000 which shows ranking and identifies the
corporations see the list compiled by the Policy Research Institute at Corporations.org
http://www.corporations.org/system/top100.html For an insightful analysis of corporate power in law and
society, see Roger Cotterell, The Sociology Of Law, (1992) 123-130. Leading Australian corporate law
scholar, Paul Redmond observes: “Adolph Berle’s claim 40 years ago that corporate law would become the
constitutional law of the new economic state no longer seems fanciful, if it ever did. The distinctive social
issues posed by the corporate ascendancy need to be addressed…” P. REDMOND, COMPANIES AND
SECURITIES LAW: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS, 3RD ED, (2000), vii.
51

M. Jensen, “Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function,” 14(3) J.
Smith, "The Shareholder Primacy Norm," 23 J. Corp. L. 277, 302-03
(1998). Henry Hansmann And Reinier Kraakman “The End Of History For Corporate Law” January 2000
Yale Law School Working Paper No. 235; NYU Working Paper No. 013; Harvard Law School Discussion
Paper No. 280; Yale SOM Working Paper No. ICF - 00-09
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=204528 For some criticisms identifying the flaws of
shareholder primacy model, Mirsch, Michaels, and Friedman, “Clean Models v Dirty Hands” Why
Economics is Different from Sociology,” In ZUKIN AND DIMAGGIO EDS., STRUCTURES OF CAPITAL: THE
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE ECONOMY, (1990), Prentice, “Aspects of Corporate Governance Debate,” in
PRENTICE AND HOLLAND EDS., CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1993).
52
Jennifer Hill, “Public Beginnings Private Ends: Should Corporate Law Privilege the Interests of
Shareholders?” 9 AJCL 21 (1998).
OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8–21(2001).
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effective use of resources in creating the maximum product possible from those
resources. Business scholars mean creating the maximum profit from the resources.
While both scholars deal with money as the main resource, the difference is in the means
to or view of the end product. The economist is concerned with both internalities and
externalities, and so, how these things are accounted for whether public or private is
irrelevant. The business scholar, however, sees a great distinction between internalities
and externalities. For the business scholar, the greater the negative externalities, the
greater the positive internalities or “profit” and hence the more attractive the enterprise
appears to be. Getting more of the costs outside of the corporation, or in other words, the
more one is able to externalize the negatives the more profitable, or desirable what
remains is. Hence it is only logical to observe that increased activity of business
corporations and increased negative externalities are correlated phenomena.
4) COSTS
The next important discussion concerns the notion of costs. At its most basic level, the
existence of a thing precludes the non-existence of that same thing. This mutually
exclusive existence-non-existence condition creates what economists refer to as an
externality. That is, each condition creates an inevitable anti-condition or “externality.”53
Externalities are either positive (beneficial) or negative (harmful). When the externality
is negative, it is called a cost. Costs are the negative impact or loss of any activity or
thing.
Externalities are explained by Cooter and Ulen as a problem that occurs when “the utility
or production functions of different people are interdependent,… [imposing] benefits or
costs upon each other, regardless of whether or not they have agreed” and are

53

Interestingly, some calculations indicate that the total economic production of activity on the planet
results in a net loss once all “externalities” are factored in. Accordingly, the terminology of “externality”
has been questioned. Kysar, supra n. 2, 35. The problem of externalities in economics was first identified
by A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 149-79 (1920).

55259-text.native.1157938490

20

externalities “because the costs or benefits are conveyed outside of a market.” 54 As noted
in the Introduction to this article the topic is social cost—i.e. the cost to the people who
make up society.
There have been a number of approaches to the problem of social costs. One approach to
social costs has been to increase private property. Hardin’s famous article “The Tragedy
of the Commons”55 is often cited as the proof positive of the impossibility of preserving
the environment without private property rights. In his startling article, Hardin observed
that when people had unlimited access to communal property or “commons”, their
overuse of the commons led to its demise. By way of contrast, Hardin observed that
private property is maintained at sustainable levels. From this observation, Hardin
concluded that the best way to preserve things held in common is to break up the
commons, destroying public property rights and create private property.56
Hardin’s argument has been adopted as a model for much economic thought and
subsequent policy; however, as we have seen, social costs are mounting in both quantity
and seriousness of consequence.57 This conclusion too should cause us to re-examine
Hardin’s approach. Hardin’s analysis is based on the usefulness of common property
rights, or more accurately, the results of holding property in common. The general
analysis, however, fails to acknowledge that the destructive impact of common use only
occurred once the profit motive was introduced.58 In other words, as long as people are
54

ROBERT COOTER AND THOMAS ULEN LAW AND ECONOMICS 2ND ED. 139 (1997).
Garrett Hardin. "The Tragedy of the Commons," 162 SCIENCE, 1243-1248, 1246 (1968). Available on
line at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/162/3859/1243.pdf?ijkey=W762Xr9TwfD4g
56
The discussion which ensues ignores that property is a social construction, meaning that property is
whatever a society decides to recognize and value. Examples of property can include honours, offices, and
humans. See M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENCE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY, (1983), 7-9.
See, or course, Aristotle’s discussion of such in NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, (1980) trans. by D. Ross, Bk. 5,
Ch. 2, 3.
57
Hardin was an internationally recognized authority on population control and policy. It is worthwhile to
note that he was not blind to the coordination problem in pollution control matters and indeed it was one of
his concerns in writing his piece. See for example, his discussion in Tragedy, supra n. 55.
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D. Feeny et al “The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty years later” in (18) 1 HUMAN ECOLOGY.(1990) 119. See the discussion in Ortega Santos, Antonio. 2000. "Commons: Past and Present, in Mediterranean
Societies: Property Rights and Modes of Use." Presented at "Constituting the Commons: Crafting
Sustainable Commons in the New Millenium", the Eighth Conference of the International Association for
the Study of Common Property, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, May 31-June 4
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00000320/00/santosa040800.pdf
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using goods in common for their own sustenance needs, they are more than willing and
able to manage property communally.59 Once, however, the ability to profit is
introduced, the over-exploitation of the resource occurs and some form of control over
the exploitation of the resource appears necessary. Still, whether that control is best done
by means of privatization or some other regulatory regime, remains unclear.60
Other criticisms of Hardin’s view have been developed.61 For example, scholars have
noted that Hardin’s assumption that the only rational behaviour is to increase material
consumption without regard for leisure, cultural or intellectual activities.62 Further,
Hardin equates self-interest with certain ideas about private property, individual freedom,
and the utility of maximizing wealth in the free market system. In essence, Hardin’s
thesis is “that people cannot work out sustainable ways to utilize common-property
resources on their own”63 and therefore, all property must be given over to private
control. Hardin’s thesis has been a critical in supporting corporate domination of more
and more of the commons, for if individuals cannot organize the commons as common
property, more private property must be created, and those with the capital to accumulate
the property have the social obligation, one could argue, to do so. It is a basic
justification for corporate domination of the world.

59

Cooter and Ulen note the example of Icelandic pastoralists limiting the number of animals permitted into
the summer pastures. Supra n. 54, 148. But this phenomena was common in feudal England and with the
land use practices of the Scottish crofters as well. Cooter and Ulen’s analysis is helpful in stipulating the
particular conditions conducive to the common approach, and contrast it with the over use of oyster beds in
New England. However, their analysis does not go far enough to include the profit motive. For a broader
consideration of the notion of public good which challenges the basic assumptions of the non-rivalrous
consumption and non-excludability criterion, see Katharina Holzinger “The Provision of Transnational
Common Goods: Regulatory Competition for Environmental Standards,” In COMMON GOODS:
REINVENTING EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, ED. A. HÉRITIER. (2001). Boulder, CO.
60
COOTER AND ULEN, supra n. 54.
61
For a sophisticated analysis of the coordination problem and response from economists known as
ecological economists, see Kysar, supra n. 2. Pierre Lasserre and Antoine Soubeyran “A Ricardian Model
of the Tragedy of the Commons” Working Paper No. 20-01 (February 2001)
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56.
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Paul B. Trawick “Successfully Governing the Commons: Principles of Social Organization in an Andean
Irrigation System,” 29 HUMAN ECOLOGY,1, 2 (2001).
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Another approach to costs has been legal. Traditionally, law has been the way of dealing
with problematic costs between people. Either through legislation or by common law,
law has been able to resolve property rights disputes through its various principles and
doctrines. These principles include notions of justice and rights, and the doctrines
include the doctrines of nuisance, causation, and rights in rem and in personam. More
recently, law and economics have been combined to develop an economic analysis of
traditional legal problems. A leader in this new discipline of law and economics64 is the
University of Chicago economist, Ronald Coase, to whose analysis we now turn.
a) Coase’ Theory on Social Costs
Coase’s landmark article “The Problem of Social Costs”65 is an elegant argument,
concerning cattle herdsmen and farmers, doctors and confectioners, and neighbours of
adjoining properties. His article is an effort to demonstrate that people will resolve their
disputes smoothly regardless of what the law says. Essentially, Coase argues that where
people can bargain, they will bargain for the rights that will bring them the best return on
their investment, and further, that where they can do so in a costless environment without
legally imposed liability structure, they will do so creating from an economic perspective,
the most efficient use of resources and maximum level of production.
Coase correctly identifies the issue as “should A be allowed to harm B or should B be
allowed to harm A?” Coase is also correct in his analysis: from an economic perspective,
Who gets the right to harm is irrelevant.66
To make his point, Coase examines the case of Bryant v. Lever67 in which the court had
to decide the rights as between neighbours. Should a neighbour who had been using his
chimney for several years without problems have the right to continue to do so? Or
should the other neighbour be permitted to stack wood on top of his house for his own
64

Minda, supra n.5 604
Coase, supra n. 20 1.
66
This perspective is what is so foreign to lawyers and most people. Both legal and traditional thinking is
that it does matter who does what do whom. This issue from this perspective is who caused the harm, and
that person is the one who should pay for damage. COOTER AND ULEN, supra n. 54.
65
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benefit although causing the neighbour’s chimney to smoke? Coase said the issue should
be resolved by the economics of the situation.
From Coase’s economic perspective, the problem is caused in part by each party—the
one party by lighting his chimney and the other party by stacking wood. He suggests that
the case should be solved by looking at the economic costs and economic benefits
generated by the activities, and then engaging in transacting so as to produce the most
efficient outcome. Causation is not the issue—the issue is permitting activities which
make the most of the resources.
Coase points out that:
The reasoning employed by the courts in determining legal rights will often seem
strange to an economist because many of the factors on which the decision turns
are, to an economist, irrelevant. Because of this, situations which are, from an
economic point of view, identical will be treated quite differently by the courts.
The economic problem in all cases of harmful effects is how to maximise the
value of production.68
The court’s analysis of Bryant v. Lever was based on the doctrine of lost grant. Lord
Cotton identified the legal issue as identifying rights in order to trace causation and to
identify in turn whose right preceded whose. This activity he recognized is as an
ultimately a fruitless exercise. From the legal perspective then, the issue becomes a
matter of pragmatics. The law solves the problem by drawing an arbitrary line, calls it
the “doctrine of lost grant” and finishes the case.
Coase’s comment about this legal solution is humourous. He writes: “the ‘doctrine of lost
grant’ is about as relevant as the colour of judge’s eyes.”69 But the legal doctrine
embodies old solutions to problems only relatively recently recognized by economists.
To explain this legal result in terms meaningful to an economist, one would say that to
follow the line of causation all the way back in history to the right associated with the
67

4. C.P.D. 172, (1878-1879), cited in Coase, supra n. 20, 11. Coase’s assumption is that all activity is to
be measured against or valued by its relation to production.
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Coase supra n. 20, 17.
69
Id 15.
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original owners and then trace them forward through title is to increase information costs
exponentially and fail to appreciate bounded rationality of the human condition. Coase
has failed to address one of law’s benefits: the reasoning for legal rules, and in this case,
limited information and information costs, undetected externalities, the incremental
nature of some externalities, and the fundamental fairness required for a society to
continue peacefully. For the economist, the role of law is solely to define legal rights and
provide predictability.70 These legal rights and institutions permit people to act in selfinterested ways without regard for the non-legally enforceable (property) rights of
others.71 Economics fails to appreciate much about law and the society it promotes.72
In Coase’s hypothetical world, aside from property rights law is irrelevant because it does
not add to efficiency and hence does not add to overall social product. People resolve
their disputes on the basis of the dollar value of an activity. Which activities should be
undertaken are determined on the basis of the total social value of potential production.
This calculative exercise, argues Coase, should include total social costs. Imposition of
liability by law makers should be avoided as creating legal liabilities increases transaction
costs. Reallocation in a society with legally imposed liability schemes impairs achieving
increased social production because the parties are forced to expend greater effort to
reallocate the resources.
Given the importance of his insight and the remarkably broad application his theory has
found, it is unfortunate that Coase has identified only one of the assumptions of his
model: that it works only in a zero-transaction cost environment.73 Had he considered
70

Id 21.
Id. 31. Cooter and Ulen note this as the costs of non-cooperative legal rules in their example where
instead of relying on competitive legal rules, by coincidence, a cattle rancher and corn farmer get married.
Supra n. 54, 80
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Robin Malloy attempts to address this problem in his book, Law and the Market Economy by discussing
semiotics, although his success in doing so may be questioned.
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Despite the acclaim his article received, subsequent studies have put his views into doubt. More recent
studies suggest he may not be correct. See for example, Dan Usher, “The Coase theorem is tautological,
incoherent or wrong,” 61 ECON. LETTERS 3, 3 (1998). Cooter “Coase” in the NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS. Andrew Halpin “Disproving The Coase Theorem?” working paper of the author at University
of Southampton School of Law. Paper available on line at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID424820_code030813140.pdf?abstractid=424820&mirid
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other assumptions, his theorem may have contributed to a much deeper, more broadly
socially beneficial outcome and included more forcefully the social costs he considered.
Having limited his discussion of the phenomena of social costs in private transactions and
his explanation of assumptions to the zero-transaction costs environment, he draws the
economic conclusion that the initial allocation of rights is unimportant. His argument,
however, is meaningless in the real world—and interestingly, this criticism is not a
criticism with which he would disagree.74 As he explains, economic analysis has a
different objective, to which we turn next.
b) Coase’s Recommendations: Private vs. Public
For Coase, the public-private distinction is irrelevant. The issue is maximizing overall
social product. Coase suggests that the appropriate level of analysis in nuisance is total
social product and rights, not things such as factories, smoke and homes.75 The issue for
Coase is: “one of choosing the appropriate social arrangement for dealing with the
harmful effects. All solutions have costs.”76
Coase identifies three alternative social arrangements or orderings of production:
government, the private firm, and do nothing. He allows that at times government may
more efficiently deliver services, but to him, the central distinction is that government has
the power to seize private property.77
Coase’s analysis has broad implications for law. In matters of nuisance or social costs,
traditional legal analysis gets it wrong. As he puts it “the belief that it is desirable that the
business which causes harmful effects should be forced to compensate those who suffer
damage is undoubtedly the result of not comparing the total product obtainable with
alternative social arrangements.” 78 As he observes: “The proper procedure is to compare
the total social product yielded by these different arrangements. The comparison of
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Coase argues that economic argument needs to be more focused on reality.
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private and social products is neither here nor there.”79 But there are a number of highly
problematic assumptions inherent in his approach in which all is merely a matter of the
transaction of property rights. We turn to discuss these assumptions next.

c) Coase’s Assumptions
Consider, for example, that Coase’s transaction of property rights approach fails to
address adequately the problem of non-identified commons, and people without resources
to pay for things or rights they value. All of Coase’s examples deal with individuals who
have property—i.e. wealth. Coase does not deal with those who do not have sufficient
resources.
Furthermore, Coase does not seem to consider that private firms do the equivalent of
government seizure when they utilize the commons by their externalities. Such activity is
equivalent to seizure of the commons. Additionally, the only value is the economic
value, or more accurately, the revenue generating possibilities of the property. There is
no discussion of fairness or such things as happiness that make life worthwhile, known to
economists as “psychic income.”80
Further, Coase does not look at the non-monetized costs. What are the costs to the
comfort of the family without a chimney? Put differently, what is the value of the
individual and individual rights in a society. Consider, for example, that perhaps the
family will be more susceptible to illness, or if it is forced to move, the members may
suffer from increased insecurity and not be able to make an adjustment socially, at school
or at work. He does not discuss the fact that a person with more assets has more mobility,
and so has more alternatives, and ultimately a stronger bargaining position than someone
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Lester C. Thurow, “Psychic Income: Useful or Useless?” 68(2), THE AMERICAN ECON. REV., Papers and
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who is poor.81 He does not seem to identify the problem faced by people without the
alternative of moving, or not having cash to buy the right to have a chimney extended to
stave off the cold of winter, nor yet the unfairness some economic outcomes may impose
on the parties.
d) Criticisms of Coase82

81

Coase alludes to the further problem of unequal parties bargaining with each other when he states “What
payment would in fact be made would depend on the shrewdness of the farmer and the cattle raiser as
bargainers. Supra n. 20, 5
82
There are many criticisms of Coase that could be included. Perhaps the most penetrating criticism,
particularly of Coase’s view that private property rights are the best solution to social costs is V.V. Chari
and Larry E. Jones, “A Reconsideration of the problem social cost: Free riders and monopolists” 16(1)
ECONOMIC THEORY 1 (2000).
For purposes of brevity and focus the criticisms discussed in the body of the paper are only those with the
most direct bearing on the matter. In thinking about Coase, however, one must consider the broader issues
which Coase’ hypothetical world fails to address such as who values and transacts public goods and how?
A dollar value on public goods does not address the actual value received by the public from the public
good. Take for example, Coase’s rancher and farmer. What is the value to the public of a herd of cattle as
opposed to a field of corn? The considerations are not what Coase has identified: again, his analysis is far
too limited in its perspective. In his example there are also the problems of methane gas produced by
cattle, as well as the pollution to streams from their wastes. Further, the production of cattle increases the
demands on the land for producing cattle feed and reduces the land available for other uses. Nor yet does it
take account for the fact that cattle grazing accounts for 35% of the erosion of the planet’s arable land.
Similarly, corn production requires consideration of the costs and benefits of monoculture agricultural
production. The inputs of energy to create fertilizer, pesticides, herbicides, as well as the destruction of the
soil by compaction of the soil and monoculture itself need to be considered. Furthermore, each of these
facets of corn production have long term, environmental effects such as algae blooms in significant areas of
the ocean, dying rivers and the exhaustion of the soil requiring the removal of land from agricultural use.
The marginal utility of land is a more difficult calculation as it includes not only the above mentioned
factors but also change will be forced in production as a result of depletion of the world’s petroleum
resources, loss of productive land due to global warming and increased demand for food production
resulting from the world’s population doubling over the next fifty years. Society needs to make hard
decisions about whether more cattle feed for the inefficiencies of wealthy beef eating consumers or more
efficiently for food for the rest world needs to be produced. Such concerns are, of course, the complexities
that concerned Keynes. See Anna Carabelli and Nicolo De Vecchi, (2000) “Individuals, Public Institutions
and Knowledge: Hayek and Keynes,” IN P.PORTA, R. SCAZZIERI, A.SKINNER (EDS), KNOWLEDGE, SOCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND THE DIVISION OF LABOUR, 232.
Given the immense amount of information needed to be collected, processed, analyzed, not to mention the
matters of probability, and uncertainty, suggest that economic analysis alone is not sufficient to rely on.
The costs of error in such calculations are too great to imagine, and accordingly, it may be appropriate to
look to some other tools or values in preserving the planet.
Thus, the inability to calculate these goods suggests that Coase’s view of the matter while interesting and
helpful at a micro-level is of next to no use at a macro level. Coase does address some of these objections
such as the overall damage of activities directly and such non-economic values as poor people needing
food, (supra n. 20, 24) the value of social peace by preventing nuisance by using reasonable care and not
waiting until there is complaint --quoting with approval from the case of Andreae v. Selfridge and
Company Ltd; (Id. 23) however, the “Coasean” tradition, (See his Nobel Lecture) like the Pigovian
tradition he complains about, (Id. 17) has been taken to mean something else.
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1991/coase-lecture.html
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As noted, Coase’s work has received wide acclaim. Indeed, he has been awarded the
Nobel Prize in Economics for his work. Due to its pervasive use and citation, it merits a
careful and thorough criticism. Despite its general acceptance, Coase’s work has not
been received with equanimity in the legal, economics, or law and economics
communities.83 Among the most trenchant of the criticism are those raised by Cooter in
his article “The Costs of Coase.”84 Cooter notes, among other criticisms, that Coase’s
examination is limited exclusively to one-on-one strategic game situations. This
limitation is critical for a number of reasons.85 First, and perhaps most importantly, such
strategic games are zero sum. In such games, no rational player is willing to give up
more in order to resolve the solution and so the problems posed are in fact, intractable.86
Accordingly, there is no rational solution.
Coordination problems are those types of problems that require coordination of differing
and conflicting interests among parties who together form a united whole. Coordination
problems make up the vast majority of society’s problems including social costs—yet
Coase’s solution does not address these either. Finally, Cooter notes that Coase operates
on a very optimistic assumption, that despite the aforementioned intractability caused by
the rationality assumption, people will cooperate. As Cooter puts it, the opposite and
more realistic assumption is a pessimistic one, one which he calls the “Hobbes
Theorem.”87 In Hobbes’ view of society, people will fight rather than share. Where such
is the case, Coase’s theory is useless beyond its value as an intellectual exercise.
In fact, Coase does not claim that his paper is about the irrelevance of liability in a situation which is free
from transaction costs. Nor is his paper about irrelevance of the initial allocations of rights. Rather he
identifies the point of his paper clearly and quite contrary to these various interpretations. He suggests that
the goal of his article is to “indicate what the economic approach to the problem should be.” It is not
prescriptive of the total approach. In his own words, the point of his paper is that while “it would clearly be
desirable if the only action performed were those in which what was gained was worth more than what was
lost. But in choosing between social arrangements… we should have regards for the total effect. This,
above all, is … [the] approach which I am advocating.”
83
There is empirical evidence that the Coase theorem is incorrect. See note 73 supra. How counterfactual
evidence is dealt with is a particular problem for economics and challenges its claims to be a science. See
Hausman, supra n. 16.
84
Robert Cooter “The Cost of Coase,” 11 J. OF LEGAL STUDIES, 14 (1982).
85
Id
86
Id.
87
Id. Cooter develops a valuable normative theorem concerning the role of law from his Hobbes’
Theorem. He writes: “the normative Hobbes theorem: Structure the law so as to minimize the harm caused
by failures in private agreements.” Cooter and Ulen, supra n. 54, 90. This theorem’s importance to the
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If one accepts Cooter’s criticism, it leads to Coase’s second ordering of production,
namely, a dominant role for government. It is government’s job to coordinate diverse
interests, not private individuals who have their own means—money, power and
violence—to impose their “solutions” on the rest of society.88 In other words, social
costs are no longer a mere concern of bargaining as between two individuals, nor yet a
smaller group of easily identifiable individuals. It is a matter to be dealt with exactly by
such mechanisms as liability created by law. This conclusion is controversial because
Coase’s thought and neo-classicism in law and economics, discussed next, is usually used
to support the opposite conclusion—namely, that private orderings are preferable to any
and all government orderings.

5) LAW AND ECONOMICS
a) The L&E Model of the corporation
In the last decades of the twentieth century Corporate law has been dominated by Law
and Economics.89 Easterbrook and Fischel’s “The Economic Structure of Corporate
Law”90 is a monumental work in the intellectual landscape of both Law and Economics
(L&E) and corporate law. It quite clearly sets out the agenda of the corporation and
makes a coherent normative argument for rationalizing, selecting and developing
corporate law along a single path.

matter will be discussed below as structuring law to minimize social costs, and hence, reform corporate law
along these lines.
88
See for example, matters raised by HAROLD DEMSETZ OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND THE FIRM, (1988) 26181 and in particular, his criticism of Block. This point, of large scale coordination problems being
particularly intractable with respect to externalities is the topic of V.V. Chavi & Larry Jones, “A
reconsideration of the problem of social cost: Free riders and monopolists” (2000) 16 Economic Theory, 1.
They observe “In large economies with decentralized systems, problems caused by externalities lead to
outcomes far from the efficient level.” 19. Although somewhat technical in parts, it is clear that the issue
of incomplete markets for externalities discussed by Coase, that the market solution is simply not viable.
89
Minda supra n. 5.
90
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL R. FISCHEL THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
(1991)
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As they state in the preface “we conclude that corporate law has an economic structure
that increases wealth of all by supplying the rules that investors would select if it were
easy to contract more fully.”91 They spend the balance of their work examining the
general principles of corporate law and the specific rules that support that conclusion.
Generally, they argue that corporate law is what investors would select if they were given
the opportunity to contract, namely, efficiency leading to wealth maximization. Their
attention is drawn to and focused upon the economic explanations of corporate law’s
principles and rules. The crux of the dilemma from their perspective is finding a balance
between the ability to raise funds and the ability to control management.92
Easterbrook and Fischel start their explication of corporate law with a few short answers
for their would be critics. They state that large corporations, including multinationals one
assumes, are the product of success in satisfying investors and customers.93 In other
words, the corporations that exist, exist because they are the best. It is a robust view of
survival of the fittest, the most worthy survive and grow, the weaker, inferior ones die. It
suggests that the large corporation deserves its place and power because it is the best at
what it does, or possibly, that it is most suited to the environment in which it exists.
They explain their approach as positive (i.e. descriptive) rather than normative (i.e.
prescriptive), although they admit to straying into the normative realm on occasion. This
approach is reasonable within their assumptions: where the corporate structure is
supposed to reflect the investors’ wishes, and where the investors’ wishes produce the
greatest efficiency and hence the greatest good for society, the laws indeed should reflect
those assumptions. Indeed, as argued here, that law “should reflect those assumptions”
demonstrates that at times, economics cannot but be normative. Where it has identified
the goals and within its own limited framework, the best way to achieve those goals, to
pursue other means is simply perverse.94
91

Id, Preface, vii.
This is a contemporary version of the A. Berle and G. Means concern resulting from the separation of
“ownership” and management. A. BERLE AND G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY. REV. ED. (1968).
93
Id, 4.
94
Pouncy, supra n. 16.
92
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b) Assumptions of the L&E Theory of Corporate Law
Easterbrook and Fischel, state that they accept only one assumptions—the assumption of
implied investor consent. Therefore, they argue that they are engaging in a strictly
positive exercise. They are merely describing the corporation as they find it, and reject
any theoretical starting point. Interestingly, before one can make sense of their argument,
one needs to understand their theory. Both their economic theory as subscribers to neoclassical economic theory and their theory of the corporation are quite developed and
wide ranging.
Fellow law and economics scholar, Robin Malloy, identifies the following five
assumptions as forming the basis of neo-classical law and economics:95
i) people are rational and therefore act in their own self-interest. This position
suggests that the appropriate role of central planners is minimal, and that the
aggregate of these individual self-interested choices is the best for society.
ii) People have complete and perfect information, and that the current
distribution of education is appropriate.
iii) Free movement to follow economic opportunity is available and appropriate to
all people and that the effects of dislocation are not relevant.
iv) Free market and competition are desirable and the outcome of competition is
desirable, and
v) The current distribution of wealth is accepted because it came about by just
means and furthermore, any re-distribution would be unfair or inequitable.
These neo-classical economic assumptions are fundamental to Easterbrook and Fischel’s
work. As applied to law, corporate law, and legal theory, the main tenets of their theory
are that:
•

95

efficiency is the primary objective of law,

LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THEORY AND PRACTICE, (1990) 53-5.
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•

the market is the most efficient method of resource allocation, not government
imposed distributions,

•

corporations are the best vehicle for coordinating resources,

•

utility can be equated wealth not social justice, happiness or civil peace,

•

only those with wealth sufficient to be investors need be concerned or consulted
about resource allocation in production,

•

increasing the wealth of those with wealth is the fundamental principle of
economic activity,

•

all other forms of wealth such as environmental wealth including biodiversity and
clean environment, or social wealth like psychic income, cultural heritage and
knowledge are unimportant,

•

concerns of distributive justice are irrelevant, and

•

the future of the planet and interests of future generations should be subjected to
the appropriate present value calculations subject to present value discounting,
which is a discounting of the value of the future.

Once one accepts all of these tenets underlying their theory, one is free to move on with
the authors, “free of theory,” to examine corporate law as it is. As they have it, investor
choice is optimal “because the choices do not impose cost on strangers to the contracts,
[and so] what is optimal for the firms is optimal for society.”96 As they put it, having
dealt with the preliminaries—the corporate contract,97 limited liability and voting in the
introductory chapters of their work—they “arrive at the relation between shareholders
and managers which holds center stage for the rest of this book.”98
Easterbrook and Fischel define the corporation as an “extra-market, team method of
production with certain costs and benefits. Corporations are a finance device and are not

96

Easterbrook supra n. 54, 6-7.
Reading Joo’s work, examining “economic contract” and “legal contract” supra n. 34 alongside
Easterbrook and Fischel’s work is an invaluable exercise which sheds considerable light on the confusion
and consequent complexities and conundrums created by confounding economic and legal understandings
of the term “contract.”
98
EASTERBROOK supra n. 54, 90
97
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otherwise distinctive.”99 As it is the investors who bear the risk of loss, so too, they
should have the benefit of the reward.100
Further concerning this nexus of contracts model, they observe, that corporate law is
designed to support:
The complex arrangements of many sorts that those who associate voluntarily in
the corporation will work out among themselves. The form of reference is a
reminder that the corporation is a voluntary adventure, and that we must always
examine the terms on which real people have agreed to participate.101
Accordingly, “the role of corporate law at any instant is to establish rights among
participants.”102 The corporation is a wonderful finance tool in which every individual
has complete bargaining freedom to buy and sell what he or she likes at prices that reflect
the value of those things to each party. Working within their model, they are certainly
correct.
c) Criticisms of the L&E Model
Given this nature of the corporation and the values of freedom of contract to many
people, it is undoubtedly true that from a normative perspective, corporate law should
reflect what the parties would contract, and that corporate law should be guided by the
parties and not the regulators.103 This particular view of the corporation and the
interested parties leads them to the interesting conclusion that the goal of the corporation
is a matter of complete indifference. As they put it: “what is the goal of the
corporation?…. who cares?”104 Since all are free participants, all should be free to do as
they choose. Risk bearers get residual claims, non-risk bearers get fixed returns. Should
those who have fixed returns prefer the residual claim, it is a rather simple matter for any
99

Id 10.
Id 11.
101
Id 12.
102
Id 14
103
Id 15.
104
Id 35-36. Although they do not spell it out in their text, Easterbrook and Fischel are following Coase’s
ideas on liability and allocation of rights. Who has what rights and liabilities is irrelevant in the quest to
increase overall social wealth. Whatever arrangement has the greatest level of production is best, and
Coase argues, that left to themselves without transaction costs, market players will find that arrangement on
their own.
100
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one of them to simply withdraw their fixed return investment, switch and invest in the
residual claim.105
Their justification for an economic analysis of corporate law is correct as far as it goes.
As they observe, the same pressures affecting the shape of markets are the same pressures
that affect the structure of corporate law.106 Although not identified by the authors, one
assumes they are referring to competitive pressures arising from efficiencies. It is
unfortunate that they fail to identify the pressures as surely the market’s pressures include
such things as: strategic behaviour, desire for power and dominance, defensive
behaviours, inefficiencies caused such behaviours, and efforts to maximize profits by
externalizing as many costs as possible. Had they done so, their analysis of corporate law
would have been significantly more valuable and their analysis of the corporate law and
normative conclusions would have been much more nuanced and they wold have had to
address at least some of the social costs which are of concern to this article.
Easterbrook and Fischel acknowledge social costs but find they are best dismissed from
an analysis of corporate law. They write:
We do not address optimal ways to deal with pollution, bribery, plant closings,
and other decisions that have effects on people who may not participate in the
corporate contract. Society must choose whether to conscript the firm’s strength
(its tendency to maximize wealth) by changing the prices it confronts or by
changing its structure so that it is less apt to maximize wealth. The latter choice
will yield less of both good ends than the former.107
They may be correct about their conclusion—although they provide neither evidence nor
argument—if there is no middle ground, and if, as they suppose the soviet experience is
the only alternative and that it has indeed failed.108 Their suppositions about wealthy
105

Assuming of course that the only investment one has is financial, or alternatively that a “contractor”
such as a telemarketing employee has sufficient funds on hand to permit them the simple switch to
investing in dividend bearing shares the dividends of which would replace his or her income from
telemarketing.
106
Id 8.
107
Id 38. Again, like most law and economics scholars, Easterbrook and Fischel fail to explain why the
particular goods they focus on should dominate the discussion and society as a whole. See Walzer, supra n.
56.
108
See Harvard economist, Jonas Kornai, “What the Collapse of Socialism does and does not mean.” 14(1)
J. OF ECON. PERSP, 27-42. One also must remember that the soviet government accomplished a level of
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firms in light of experience are questionable. “Wealthy firms provide more jobs, …better
working conditions and clean up their outfalls… [etc.]”109 One of the banes of the
increasingly dominant multi-national corporations is their failure in each of these areas as
they increasingly look to lower costs by moving to poor countries where they do none of
the supposed wealthy firm activities.110
Although they claim that they are not panglossian, one is hard pressed to find a better
term with which to describe them.111 As they view it, corporate governance is really only
a matter of better-defined property rights. They make the assertion, without argument,
No reagrrangement of corporate governance structures can change this [social
costs]. The task is to establish property rights so that the firm treats the social
costs as private ones, and so that its reactions, as managers try to maximize profits
given these new costs… to view pollution… or other difficult moral and social
questions as governance matters is to miss the point.112
But these social costs are precisely the point and the current model is precisely a
significant cause of the problem.
Finally, they ignore a number of important issues. In their analysis, the big corporation is
big because it is fittest for survival, they ignore 1) merger and acquisitions which often
simply absorb the success of other’s ability to innovate, produce and market, 2)
undervaluing the actual contribution of a business to the community—corporate raiders
look for corporations with sufficient capital to meet potential corporate liabilities which
are often simply sustainable practices, 3) stealth, deceptive, strategic behaviour and
efforts to create monopolies, 4) luck in timing: right place, right time, 5) the role of right

industrialization in 70 years that the west required more than 200 years to accomplish. While some may
see this as an argument in favour of communism, it is intended as cautionary and a source for a bit of
humility in the capitalist societies. See Chomsky’s discussion of this error with respect to SE Asia and
Latin America, in Chomsky supra, n. 3, 32-35, and discussion 92, 93.
109
Id 38.
110
STIGLITZ supra n. 3.
111
Indeed a book review of their work in the Harvard Law Review is titled, “Dr. Pangloss meets the Coase
Theorem.” (1992) 105 Harv. L. Rev., 1408.
112
Id 39.
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connections, and 6) the anti-social, un-ethical behaviour of many corporate founders and
successors.113
So far, we have developed an understanding of Social Costs as those costs that are borne
by non-parties to activities, and particularly, income generating activities. Further, we
have seen that the traditional Social Cost analysis as developed by Coase has viewed the
problem as solved by individual participants in a market setting rather than through law.
We have noted that Coase’s analysis of Social Costs fails to address coordination
problems, being those problems that involve solving conflicting interests in using goods.
Further, we have seen that because of its commitment to neo-classical economics, law
and economics tends to view the objective of law narrowly as maximizing wealth and to
disregard public good. In this context corporations and corporate law are about fulfilling
the interests of the parties privy to the corporate contract. It is generally assumed that
there is but one interest and that is increasing the efficiency of corporation, and in
particular, in the business sense of efficiency increasing internal profits—that is, by
increasing externalities, the social costs. This analysis allows the author to suggest that
corporations increase social cost. To test this hypothesis, we will now examine a
particular case.

6) CASE STUDY
Perhaps the best way to understand the nature of the problem of uncontrolled social costs
created by the Law and Economics supported nexus of contracts model of the
corporation, is by way of a case study. The world’s largest corporation is Wal-mart.114
Its corporate structure is made up of six retail divisions and five specialty divisions.115 It

113

The history of such behaviour is well documented from J.P. Morgan’s kidnapping of couriers of
competitors, to Microsoft’s continual legal battles concerning its anti-trust activities. Some of these antics
are noted in MAURY KLEIN, THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF JAY GOULD 80-86 (1986).
114
Charles Fishman, “The Wal-Mart You Don’t Know: Why Low Prices have High Costs,” 77 FAST
COMPANY MAGAZINE, 68. (Dec. 2003)
115
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. website www.Wal-Mart.com
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is a publicly traded corporation listed on the NYSE and two other exchanges. Majority
shareholders include three family members, and a number of institutional investors.116
Wal-Mart was started in the 1950’s by Sam Walton, apparently a small time store owner,
in Bentonville, Arkansas, U.S.A.117 It started as a small department store, growing into a
small regional chain, and then growing and spreading first through the southern United
States of America, and then throughout the rest of the country. It has now moved beyond
its national focus and operates internationally.
In most recent 12 month period sales were $256.3 billion in the U.S.A., and $47.5 billion
internationally.118 It has 3,566 stores in the USA119 and 1,494 in Mexico, Puerto Rico,
Canada, Argentina, Brazil, China, South Korea, Germany and the U.K.120 and plans to
expand to every market which could sustain it and protect its profits. Wal-Mart employs
1.5 million employees121 of whom more than 1.0 million are “associates” i.e. sales clerks.
At least 30% of Wal-Mart employees are part-time.122 Full-time at Wal-Mart means 28
hours or more per week. Nearly 10% of all imports from China to the USA are imported
by Wal-Mart, being of a value of about $12 billion.123 In the period 1995-2000 12% of
the growth in productivity of the American economy is believed to have resulted from
Wal-Mart.124
The effects of Wal-Mart and other big-box stores is not well researched nor well
documented. Although a recent spate of articles has started to draw attention to the
116

Yahoo Finance Quotes & Info. Wal-Mart Stores, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/mh?s=WMT
Described as a “backwater” in Jeff Randall “Wonderful world of Wal-Mart” Friday, 21 February, 2003
BBC News UK Edition. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2787951.stm
118
Randolph T. Holhut, “The Wal-Martization of the American Economy” April 26, 2004,10(2) THE
AMERICAN REPORTER 351. Its profits were $6.67 billion, or about 2.3% of sales—not an impressive figure
for retail or most industries.
119
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. website www.Wal-Mart.com
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Shils, “Measuring the Economic and Sociological Impact of the Mega-Retail Discount Chains on Small
Enterprise in Urban, Suburban and Rural Communities” Section “Wages” 95. Shils observes that as fulltime is considered 28 hours per week or more, the 30% part-time is an “exceedingly conservative figure.”
Id.
123
Fishman, supra n. 114, 68
124
McKinsey & Co. study, cited in Fishman id.
117
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issue,125 perhaps the only thorough study was done in 1997 by the leading expert on bigbox stores, Edward Shils, Director Emeritus of the Wharton Entrepreneurial Centre, at
the University of Pennsylvania.126 The Shils Report is a landmark study of the social
costs of this form of retailing. In his study, which Shils sub-titled: “Measuring the
Economic and Sociological Impact of the Mega-Retail Discount Chains on Small
Enterprise in Urban, Suburban and Rural Communities”, Shils examined the impact of
these big-box stores on the communities in which they are located. Shils’ study focused
is on two big-box stores: Wal-Mart and K-mart. The main dynamics that drew Shils’
attention were the effects on the traditional structure of the labour market in the
communities, and how it worked before and after the location of a big-box retail outlet
within a 10-15 mile radius. Our examination of the social costs of corporations will
begin with those identified by Shils. After considering Shil’s comments, the article will
turn to examine a broader group of social costs. Given the innovative nature of the study
it was not possible to utilize previously compiled lists. Social costs include, breakdown
of functioning communities, undermining markets, impoverishment of workers, harm to
democratic institutions of government, damage to culture, damage to efforts promoting
cooperation and conservation, and environmental pollution. The list was compiled on the
basis of observations concerning activities and hypothesis of costs of those activities by
corporations in general and in certain instances, as will be clear in the discussion, by
Wal-Mart in particular.
125

Brooklyn College sociology professor’s Sharon Zukin, “We Are Where We Shop” Nov. 28, 2003 The
New York Times, Anthony Bianco, Wendy Zellner, Diane Brady, Mike France, Tom Lowry, Nanette
Byrnes, Susan Zegel, Michael Arndt, Robert Berner, and Ann Therese Palmer, “Is Wal-Mart Too
Powerful?” Business Week, Oct, 6, 2003, Jack Z. Smith, “Up against the Wal-Mart,” Star-Telegram Dec. 5,
2003; “The Wal-Mart Effect,” Los Angeles Times 3 part series of Nov. 23-25, 2003; Randolph T. Holhut,
“The Wal-Martization of the American Economy” April 26, 2004, 10(2) The American Reporter 351;
Charles Fishman, “The Wal-Mart You Don’t Know: Why Low Prices have High Costs,” (Dec. 2003) Fast
Company Magazine, Vol. 77, 68. John Rausch “The Cost of Cheap Goods” Catholic Herald (Nov. 20,
2003). David Olive “Values outsourced -- What are the social costs of the Wal-Mart economy?” Oct. 18,
2003 Toronto Star. Jim Hopkins “Wal-Mart's influence grows” 29 January 2003 USA TODAY Zukin’s
research is contained in her book, Point of Purchase: How Shopping Changed American Culture (2003).
Andy Rowell, “Welcome to Wal-World: Wal-Mart’s Inexhaustible March to Conquer the Globe” (2003) 24
(10) Multinational Monitor.
http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2003/03october/october03corp2.html See also Carol Bowlby,
The Invention of Modern Shopping (2001).
126
Another expert on Wal-Mart is Kenneth E. Stone of Iowa University; however, his focus is how to stay
in business if Wal-Mart moves into the area. His main criticism of Wal-Mart can be found in Metropolis
July 1997
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a) Community impact
Traditional western communities have thriving commercial centers. These centers are
composed of a mix of retail, commercial and office space. The majority of the commerce
in these centers is transacted through small businesses. These businesses tend to be
highly involved in the community, create employment which pays sufficiently to sustain
a reasonable standard of living, pays taxes, and are innovative, community building in the
sense of promoting ideas of individual ability, responsibility and an entrepreneurial
spirit.127 Indeed, small business is often described as the “backbone” of an economy and
a community128—at least in a market economy.
Shils draws attention to the effects of shifting labour opportunities from the downtown
urban areas to suburban big-box retailers. When labour opportunities disappear
communities fall apart. When people do not employ their time with productive activities
such as working in a commercial center, they turn to other unproductive activities.
Effected malls and commercial areas tend to display levels of vacancy from 30%-40%
after a superstore moves into the radius. These vacancies represent significant losses of
small businesses and mid-level incomes.129 Further, when vacancies increase and
employment decreases, vandalism, petty crime, and drug use increase.130
Thus, when Wal-Mart establishes a retail outlet, detrimental community effects can be
expected. These effects include decreased community involvement, decreased
community building efforts, decreased small business, decreased labour opportunities,
and increased commercial vacancies.

127

Shils supra n. 122, 95.
Id, 95. The importance of small business to the Australian economy and the negative impact of big
business and big box stores in particular on Australian economies, is discussed in detail in Amanda Gome
“The Decline of Small Business.” And Amanda Gome “What’s Holding Small Business Back?” BRW
roundtable: the decline of small business, 06 May 2004 26(16) BRW MAGAZINE, 40-52.
129
Id, 102.
130
Id, This vacancy and downward spiral in a center is a phenomena that first occurred in the 1960’s and
70’s as suburbs were created in greater numbers. The socio-economic problems of gutted city centres has
yet to be resolved.
128
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b) Supplier Social Costs
Another social cost imposed by big-box stores results from the demands Wal-Mart places
on suppliers. Having Wal-Mart as a customer has both advantages and disadvantages.
On the one hand, the business’ sales increase dramatically. On the other hand, the stress
on the business increases exponentially as profit margins dip dramatically
The pressure Wal-Mart place on suppliers is enormous. Wal-Mart requires its suppliers
to drop prices annually by as much as 5%.131 There are different responses to this type of
pressure. In some instances, Wal-Mart has driven its suppliers out of business. In other
instances whole industries, such as the orange industry in the USA, have suffered severe
adverse effects.132 Another common response is for a business to cannibalize itself.
This cannibalization occurs when a business is forced to undercut its own products in
other markets (often much more profitable markets) or give up markets in order to supply
Wal-Mart. In other words, it is a zero-sum situation in which the change in business from
a profitable market to Wal-Mart has no net gain to the supplier: it is pure loss.133 And the
cost involved is borne solely by the business supplying Wal-Mart, not only through the
cannibalization, but also in the cost of shifting production resources from one product to
another. Businesses contract with Wal-Mart for different reasons, including being unable
to compete, and not having sufficient or complete information as to how Wal-Mart deals
with its suppliers.134
Interestingly, Wal-Mart’s suppliers are not free to talk to the press about their experiences
for fear of retaliation or in their terms “being in the penalty-box.”135 One executive
colourfully analogized his supplier relationship with Wal-Mart as “getting into the

131

Fishman, reporting information from Bain & Co., on of the top management consulting firms in the
world. supra n. 114, 8
132
Id. Given the particular nature of these problems, it is exceedingly difficult to get information. Usually
when businesses go bankrupt or even just out of business the information concerning causes is lost along
with the other information management may have had. Stiglitz notes this with respect to re-structuring in
various countries and the resultant need to work with officials of governments not previously in favour with
IMF administration. STIGLITZ supra n. 3.
133
Fishman supra n. 114.
134
As one supplier put it, “you talk softly when you talk to God in Bentonville.” Id.
135
Id.
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company of version of basic training with an implacable drill sergeant.”136 The stresses
of these pressures applied to the business are borne by management and employees.137
Every person involved in the business from top management on down to the part-time
floor workers are required to meet much more exacting standards—computer driven
standards. Humans are driven particularly hard to meet inflexible, to the second, machine
driven standards.138 Given the cost cutting, the exacting standards, and the huge value of
the contracts, a business simply cannot afford to fail its contractual obligations—
regardless of how unreasonably and stringently enforced. To fulfill the demands of the
low profit margins workers at all levels are forced to take on more responsibility and
given less resources. This process combined with the environment of low tolerance
increases the level of stress and stress-related problems increase dramatically.139
c) Labour Social Costs
A May 2004 study released by the University of California, Berkeley entitled “The
Hidden Public Costs of Law-wage Jobs in California”140 identifies low pay in retail as a
serious cost to the public. Interviews with one of the study’s authors identified Wal-Mart
as costing California’s taxpayers $86.0 million annually as a result of under-paying its
employees.141 They are paid minimum wage and then not permitted to work more than

136

Schils supra n. 122.
See For Example the Survey conducted by Australian Recruiters and reported Australian CPA April
2000
http://www.cpaaustralia.com.au/03_publications/02_aust_cpa_magazine/2000/16_apr/3_2_16_13_news.as
p See for example, the Thompson HR Report Issue 295, April 2003, “Managers Cause Workplace Stress,”
6, http://www.cpd.com.au/cpdnews/hrreport/Archive/HR295.htm.
138
This difficulty of humans working to machine driven rates and rhythms has been recognized as a
problem in assembly line labour but appears not to be recognized when it comes to working with
computers. The exception is among fighter plane pilots whose human cognitive ability is at times
insufficient to deal with the complexities of computer flown aircraft resulting in air crashes. See for
example, study “Optimized Visual Interfaces for Combat Pilots,” by David Bookstaber, fomer USAF pilot
and Electronic Systems Center Scientist http://bookstaber.com/david/opinion/PilotInterfaces.pdf
139
Id.
140
Carol Zabin et al, “The Hidden Public Costs of Law-wage Jobs in California” Prepared for The National
Economic Development and Law Center, May 2004
http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/livingwage/workingpoor.pdf
141
Zabin, id. Wal-Mart has issued a response to the study denying the validity of Zabin et al’s study,
Contra Costa Times, August 3, 2004. The authors of the study reply to those criticisms, indicating among
other things where Wal-Mart’s statement is “in complete contradiction with facts.” Arindrajit Dube and
Ken Jacobs, Hidden Cost of Wal-Mart Jobs Response to Wal-Mart’s Statements, August 3, 2004 at 1.
Interestingly, Wal-Mart claims that the employment figure used by the study’s authors (44,000) is incorrect
137
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28 hours per week.142 This cap on hours worked permits Wal-Mart to avoid costs such as
health insurance it may otherwise be forced to incur. Obviously, the employees are not
earning sufficient wages to live.143 Under-paying employees has a number of
consequences. Whereas prior to the arrival of the big box store, competing employers
used to pay a living-wage, once big-box stores arrive, smaller employers can no longer do
so as they are driven to cut costs or go out of business altogether.144 Wal-Mart’s size and
correlated impact on the labour market wages are driven down throughout the area, as
small businesses close and their better paying jobs are lost.145
Further, because of low wages Wal-Mart employees must look elsewhere for
supplemental income. Such supplemental income can come from the state,146 other parttime jobs, the underground economy, or illegal activities. These activities in turn have
the further consequences of additional stress, and less time to spend engaging in other
non-income generating activities “psychic income” that reduce stress and make life

and actually should be 60,500. if this is the case, the actual cost is $118.2 million.
http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/lowwage/walmart_response.pdf
142
Rausch supra n 125.
143
This is one of the main points of Zabin et al’s research, supra n. 140. Based on detailed payroll data
Wal-Mart provided in the course of a sex discrimination lawsuit, we found that its average wages were
$9.70/hr in 2001, and that 54% earned under $9/hr…. We found a 31% wage penalty for working at WalMart. Rausch calculates that the average employee earns $8.23 per hour but earns only $13,861 per annum
because of corporate policy, supra n 115. Holhut states “”Nearly half of its ‘associates’… make less than
$15,300- what the federal government considers the poverty level for a family of three. It also controls how
many of its associates achieve full-time status” supra n. 118. This later observation, of course, is simply a
management decision concerning the costs of full-time staff and the needs of the corporation in terms of
staffing. Where the corporation can provide better profits to the shareholders by keeping full-time staff to a
minimum and so avoid paying benefits and increased wages, it may well be argued that management has a
duty to do so. Wal-Mart employees are required to wait for 6 to 24 months before being able to buy health
insurance. In recognition of the fact that it is not paying a living wage, in California it provides direct
access to community social workers to provide such goods as food stamps, health insurance and other statefunded assistance. Holhut, supra n. 118. Traditionally, small business has provided these goods to
employees. Shil, at 94. For an interesting account of this issue in the USA SEE BARBARA EHRENREICH
NICKEL AND DIMED—ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA (2001)
144
Holhut observes the recent fight by food union workers in the state of California against Wal-Mart
which in comparison was paying its employees one half of what they unionized workers were earning.
Supra n. 118.
145
This point is clarified in the response of Dube and Jacobs, supra note 141, where the authors point out
that rather than creating new jobs, “The reality is that Wal-Mart jobs primarily substitute for other retail
jobs – many that pay substantially higher.” At 3. (Italics in original). They continue “Allowing for such
small net losses or gains in jobs would not meaningfully alter the estimates of public costs – which is
driven primarily by the fact that Wal-Mart pays about 30% less in wages than large retailers overall, and
23% fewer Wal-Mart workers are covered by job-based health insurance.”
146
Wal-Mart in California provides a hotline to the local welfare office for employees. Id.
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enjoyable and worthwhile. This situation is exacerbated by Wal-Mart’s refusal to pay for
certain over-time activities which refusal has formed the basis for a class-action against it
by some 65,000 employees.147
Wal-Mart’s equity decisions also seem suspect. For example, while 72% of its workforce
is female, only 33% of its management are female. Currently, it is subject to a classaction lawsuit on behalf of 1.5 million female former employees for sex
discrimination.148
Furthermore, Wal-Mart has taken a defiantly anti-union stance. It maintains an active
anti-union response team of 70 people ready to descend on any Wal-Mart where
employees are considering unionizing.149 It attempts to inoculate employees against
unions by threats150 rather than by providing competitive benefits. By way of contrast, a
successful anti-union strategy which worked for various Japanese auto manufacturers has
been to provide competitive pay and compensation packages. The result for these
employers has been to make them the employer of choice for many workers.
Wal-Mart employee dissatisfaction is high. This fact is evidenced by an employee
turnover estimated at 44% per year.151 Such dislocations have a high social cost.152
When people lose employment, even when it is low paying, they lose a sense of security,

147

Wal-Mart employees are required to participate in some activities before the stores open etc. which are
unpaid. Wal-Mart is currently subject to more than 40 lawsuits in the USA on the issue of unpaid overtime work. Rausch supra n. 125. Details are available on one of the attorney’s websites. See
http://www.lieffcabraser.com/walmart%20lawsuit.htm See also, “Wal-Mart faces class-action over off-theclock work” 6 November, 2003 USA TODAY
148
Id. The action was certified as a class action, a significant step in class-action lawsuits which recognizes
a cause of action. The certification was made by Judge Jenkins on June 21, 2004. For a copy of the
certification order see http://64.81.247.237/staticdata/walmartclass/classcert.pdf For information on the
case, see the class-action web site dedicated to the case at
http://www.walmartclass.com/walmartclass94.pl?wsi=0&websys_screen=walmartclass_casedevelopments
149
Id.
150
Holhut observes “Wal-Mart is resolutely anti-union and has perhaps the most aggressive union-busting
operation of any major U.S. corporation.” Supra n. 118.
151
Id.
152
See, for example, discussion in Booth, A. and Zoega, G. “Quitting Externalities, Employment
Cyclicality and Firing Costs.” CEPR Discussion Paper no. 1101. London, Centre for Economic Policy
1994.Research. http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP1101.asp
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and stability.153 The loss of a job undermines one’s sense of well being and dramatically
increases stress, depression and related socially damaging behaviours including excessive
alcohol consumption and gambling as people attempt to deal with stress. These costs are
passed on into their close communities of friends and family.154
In summary, Wal-Mart’s low wage policy drives down prices in the labour market. It off
loads its operating costs onto the state and other businesses. It damages the well-being of
employees by eliminating opportunity to access psychic income generating activities, and
increasing stress resulting from employee turn-over. Further, its equity and over-time
policies, and anti-unionism are manifestly opposed to the well-being of its labour force.
d) Democracy
Wal-Mart harms democracy by unduly influencing the political process needed to get
development permissions, by funding promotional school materials, by controlling which
reading materials and products get supplied to consumers,155 by anti-competitive
pricing,156 by its anti-unionism (discussed above) and by misusing tax-payer largess
intended to assist local communities stay alive and keep their economies thriving.157 A

153

M. A Dew, L. Penkower, & E.J. Bromet, “Effects of unemployment on mental health in the
contemporary family.” BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION, 15(4), 501-544 (1991), Canadian Mental Health
Association Newfoundland and Labrador Division Coping with Unemployment. (2002)..
http://www.infonet.st-johns.nf.ca/cmha/resource/publications/gcwu/cwu.html L. E. Waters, & K. A.
Moore, “Coping with economic deprivation during unemployment.” 22 J. OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY,,
461-482 (2001).
154
P. Voydanoff, “Unemployment: Family, strategies for adaptation.” IN C. R. FIGLEY & H. I. MCCUBBIN
EDS., STRESS AND THE FAMILY, II-COPING WITH CATASTROPHE (1983). 90-102. L. Jones, “Unemployment
and child abuse.” 71(10), FAMILY IN SOCIETY, 579-588 (1990).
155
Holhut notes Wal-Mart controls 15% of the market for magazines and books. Supra, n. 118.
156
Anti-competitive pricing is selling goods for less than competitors at prices which may cause a loss for
the purpose of driving a competitor out of business. After the competitor is gone, the prices are usually
raised to even higher levels. Wal-Mart has engaged in these activities. See litigation under the RobinsonPatman Act and discussed on www.lawmall.com
157
Referred to in the literature as “corporate welfare.” See for example, Ches Baragwanath, & John Howe
“Corporate Welfare Public Accountability for Industry Assistance” Centre for Employment and Labour
Relations University of Melbourne Discussion Paper Number October 2000
http://www.tai.org.au/Publications_Files/DP_Files/DP34SUM.PDF A study documenting Wal-Mart’s
receipt of these funds see Philip Mattera, Anna Purinton, Jeff McCourt, Doug Hoffer, Stephanie
Greenwood & Alyssa Talanker “Shopping for Subsidies: How Wal-Mart Uses Taxpayer Money to Finance
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major research study released in May 2004 was able to document receipt by Wal-Mart
“[of] more than $1 billion in such subsidies from state and local governments to WalMart; the actual total is certainly far higher.”158 These subsidies were designed to
promote new businesses in communities for the purposes of benefiting the community.
The main subsidies the researchers were able to document are: free or reduced-price land,
infrastructure assistance, tax increment financing, property tax breaks, state corporate
income tax credits, sales tax rebates, enterprise zone (and other zone) status, job training
and worker recruitment funds, tax-exempt bond financing, and general grants.159

Together these activities undermine a community’s ability to organize itself to pursue its
best interest. This set of activities is particularly pernicious as the community’s opponent
is a powerful organization quite able to organize itself and keep its consumers community
in the dark without good information for the purposes of its own, self interested profit
motive.

Despite all its ubiquitous statements to the contrary, consumer interests are not the
ultimate concern. Clearly, corporate profit is. Where an entity absorbs such wealth and
power, it works not only to maintain but to increase its position. This tendency is a
phenomenon identified by economists in the economic realm as an effort to control a
market by means of monopoly. Wal-Mart is open about its intentions to continue its
growth (noted above).

its Never-Ending Growth.” May 2004 Good Jobs First, Washington, DC
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/pdf/wmtstudy.pdf
158
Mattera et al, id, in the executive summary that their research “documents more than $1 billion in such
subsidies from state and local governments to Wal-Mart; the actual total is certainly far higher, but the
records are scattered in thousands of places and many subsidies are undisclosed.” The same $1 billion
figure is offered by Barbara Ehrenreich, “Wal-Mars Invades Earth” NY TIMES July 25, 2004.
159
Mattera id.
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Further, Wal-Mart reduces expression by its dominance of the market. Consumers are
free to choose whatever they like, provided Wal-Mart has agreed to provide it. This
restriction of consumer options harkens back to Henry Ford’s comment: “They can have
any colour they like so long as it is black.”
Wal-Mart has launched an attack on diversity of opinions—which form the basis of
democracy—by the restrictions it places on authors and artists who wish their goods to be
distributed as widely as possible, and given Wal-Mart’s dominance as a distributor, such
wide distribution would include being sold in Wal-Mart stores. This aspect of the
problem of democracy is dealt with in greater detail in the next subsection.
e) Cultural Control
Wal-Mart, because of its buying power, and buying practices as demonstrated above, can
and does dictate to its suppliers. It does so as well with respect to its consumers—it seeks
only those products which it can sell in vast quantities—literature without depth but
much popular appeal and movies and other entertainments with the same qualities. Based
in Bentonville, Arkansas, a conservative backwater of the Southern USA,160 it is a
product of a conservative world-view. This background continues to inform its buying
decisions and what it will permit consumers to purchase at its outlets. It has refused
products which have a particular level of sexuality. For example, Wal-Mart has refused
to print photos taken by consumers where the subject of the photo has been nude, and
further, refuses to stock certain contraceptives. 161 Further, it has insisted music lyrics be
changed or simply refused to place the product.162 It refuses to stock magazines such as
Maxim, In Style and Sports Illustrated Swimsuit163 and hides the magazine covers of
Glamor, Cosmopolitan and Redbook.164 Essentially, this is the fear in all democracies:
160

Supra n. 106.
Bianco et al, note Wal-Mart’s refusal to stock Preven, a morning after pill on the basis that it does not
want to subject its pharmacists to the moral dilemma of dispensing abortion pills. Supra n. 125.
162
Bianco et al supra n. 125. Also discussed in more detail by anti-Wal-Mart activist, Al Norman. See
story at http://www.netaxs.com/~adredd/normantext.html
163
“Wal-Mart banishes bawdy mags; Retailer takes Maxim, Stuff and FHM off the shelves, citing
complaints over racy contents.” May 6, 2003 CNN Money
http://money.cnn.com/2003/05/06/news/companies/walmart_mags/
164
Bianco, et al supra n. 125. notes this, quoting Wal-Mart general merchandise manager, Gary Stevens,
“There’s a line between provocative and pornographic. I don’t know exactly where it is.” The statement is
161
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that the tyranny of the majority will suppress the views of the minority—in this case, the
fear of the minority who control Wal-Mart that the majority may oppose the political
agenda they wish to advance through Wal-Mart.165
f) Foreign, “outsourced” social costs
A broader perspective includes the activities of manufacturers who supply Wal-Mart with
the goods it desires to sell. In order to produce cheap goods, manufacturers must use the
cheapest methods. Basic economic theory suggests that one can substitute inputs and still
obtain the same outputs or goods desired. So, for example, if a manufacturer wishes to
produce good A, it can pay X amount of capital plus Y amount of labour to produce n
quantity of goods. Alternatively, it can manufacture n amount of good A with X+1 in
capital and a corresponding decrease in labour of Y-1.
In China, where Wal-Mart purchased $12 billion of its goods for the USA market,166 the
cost of labour at its factory suppliers is $0.13 per hour.167 Workers must work 13-16
hours per day, seven days per week.168 The working conditions are described as
“sweatshops” and those working to provide Wal-Mart with its low cost goods are forced
to work in conditions that consistently are rated among the worst.169 The argument that
these conditions are an improvement over unemployment are ingenuous170 as it is not

reminiscent of Justice Potter Stewart, of U.S. Supreme Court who famously stated: “I shall not today
attempt further to define pornography…but I know it when I see it.”, Jacobellis vs. Ohio, 1964. while
clearly the justice was struggling to define the issue for the good of the American public, in the early
1960’s with the information provided by a bevy of lawyers and specialists, it seems odd that a
merchandiser seems to think it his role presumably with nothing more than his parochial wisdom informing
him as to what the public should be exposed to. The exclusion seems to include various political and social
commentaries, such as those found in the arts, as noted by the Dead Kennedys, a punk band.
165
No research was conducted for this study to determine whether Wal-Mart’s cultural control has
extended to restrict the literature accepted for sale Wal-Mart stores reflects a particular political party.
166
Fishman supra n. 114.
167
Rausch supra n. 125.
168
Id.
169
Charles Kernaghan, Director of National Labor Committee, and NGO that monitors sweatshops. Cited
in Rausch. A different perspective on the value of such jobs in third world economies is offered by Eugene
B. Mihaly “Multinational Companies And Wages In Low-Income Countries” 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS.
L. 1 (1999).
170
The position in favour of trickle down economics in developing economies is well argued, in Mihaly id,
Stiglitz, indicates that the argument for trickle economics has lost credibility. Supra n. 3. The failure of
trickle down economics to work even in the country most friendly to the notion, the USA, has formed the
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clear that unemployment is the only alternative, nor that local businesses and the local
economy and environment would not be better off investing in itself and providing
products for local consumption.171
Further, in order to keep production costs low, a manager must look for every means
possible for externalizing costs. One way of doing so is by not treating wastes properly
before discharge or simply dumping them directly without any treatment whatsoever.172
While these costs are passed on to the local and national communities in developing
countries where the manufacturing is done,173 the benefit is passed on to the American
consumer who receives under-priced goods. These factories are using the oldest
technologies in order to take advantage of the cheaper labour inputs in producing low
cost goods that they must produce in order to keep Wal-Mart as a customer.
It is truly a no win situation. To not produce is to not have money in the economy
necessary to live but to have a habitable, clean environment. To produce, however,
requires incurring great social costs. Further, because of market power, the vast majority
of the economic benefits of trade are passed on to the USA while the majority of the costs
and great damage of which stay with the people and the environment of the developing
nation.
A secondary set of externalities arises from this trade. While at one time, economists
insisted that trade benefited all of society, the rising tide theory—a rising tide raises all
ships and hence, all people in a growing economy will benefit—is no longer the received
wisdom.174 As Professor G. Kent put it, “The rising tide of trade supposedly will lift all
ships. But it may be that instead, as the critics suggest, it lifts only yachts, and swamps
basis for a proposition that every American be given USD$80,000. BRUCE ACKERMAN AND ANNE
ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999), 3-5.
171
Observed by STIGLITZ id.
172
Scott Holwick, “Transnational Corporate Behavior and Its Disparate and Unjust Effects on the
Indigenous Cultures and the Environment of Developing Nations: Jota v. Texaco, a Case Study”
11COLORADO J. OF INTER’L LAW AND PO.., 183-221 (2000). This off-loading of pollution is denied by
free trade advocates.
173
Wal-Mart purchased $12 billion of its goods in China in 2003. Supra n. 115
174
Sheldon Danziger & Peter Gottschalk, Do Rising Tides Lift All Boats? The Impact of Secular and
Cyclical Changes on Poverty, 76 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 405 (1986).
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vessels that are leaky and decrepit.”175 This consideration is important in two respects.
First, by diverting resources to production for export, local markets are disrupted and new
pressures are put on participants (including local villagers and local vendors) in that
market. These pressures are largely uncompensated as the participants in those markets
are not benefited much by trade. By way of contrast, those controlling production for
export may be benefiting dramatically. This fact leads to the second consideration.
Trade for export may increase significantly inequities in a local economy exacerbating
per-existing tensions and further up-setting community orderings. While the discussion
here is not a defence of the status quo, where such changes occur, at times a gradual
approach may be less disruptive as communities have time to adapt.
Another social cost down-loaded on foreigners results not from the production impacts,
but from the demand side, the retailing model. The social costs identified as USA bound
in this article will likely occur but as amplified by the conditions found in the foreign
context. For example, Wal-Mart’s damage will hit countries like Japan hard. Japan’s
commercial sector is predominantly made up of small retailers.176 Where Wal-Mart
enters a market like the Japanese, severe dislocations of small retailers and the related
social disruption should be anticipated. Again, the benefit of the foreign subsidiaries is
directed to the USA parent,177 leaving the disruption outward in the foreign context and
the benefit inward in to the USA investors.178
It should not be considered that Wal-Mart will alter its business strategy as a result of
these social costs to foreigners. Wal-Mart’s market saturation in the USA, has led it to

175

George Kent “Food Trade and Food Rights” (2001) 3 UN Chronicle On-line Edition,
http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2002/issue1/0102p27.html
176
58% of retailers are small, family owned businesses. Wal-Mart's Foray Into Japan Spurs A Retail
Upheaval; As Giant Confronts Barriers, Local Competitors Rush To Emulate Its Methods; Balking at the
'10 Foot' Rule Sept. 19, 2003 NY TIMES.
177
That the parent – subsidiary relation is established to benefit the parent corporation should be
uncontroversial.
178
This comment is not that non-USA investors are not benefiting from the profits of Wal-Mart. Rather,
that the majority of investors are USA institutional investors, whose clients are largely USA based
corporations and other citizens.
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plan to continue its strategy in other markets.179 Thus it should be anticipated that these
social costs will continue to be imposed on countries outside the USA.
In sum, the production of goods demanded by Wal-Mart forces overproduction with
maximum social costs in poorer countries. This overproduction causes considerable
environmental harm, social dislocation, sweatshops, and disruption in local market
conditions. Further, the greater part of the benefit goes to the few wealthy in control of
the production process and the USA consumer. The cost goes to the foreign country and
the majority of its people.
g) Consumerism
Wal-Mart’s approach of increasing by supplying goods in large or bulk size creates its
own special set of problems. For example, Wal-Mart decided to use pickles to create an
impression of incredibly cheap prices.180 It pressured a supplier of high quality pickles—
if you don’t want to do this, we won’t be able to do business with you any longer—to
produce gallon181 jars of pickles for less than $3. The net result was a dramatic increase
in sales at very low margins, increased demand on farmers and all pickle producers,
undermining its high quality pickle market it had built up over the years, and eventually
contributing to the supplier’s bankruptcy. Perhaps worst of all, as an executive at the
former pickle supplier observed: “They’d eat a quarter of a jar and throw the thing away
when they got mouldy. A family just can’t eat them fast enough.”182
This problem—promoting over-consumption in a world of limited resources, currently
reeling under the environmental costs of its consumption habits—is nothing short of
moronic. Americans are the most over-weight people on the planet, spend more money
per capita on diets, consume more goods per capita than anyone else on the planet, and
Wal-Mart’s strategy, effectively, is to promote further over-consumption by underpricing more goods. Basic economic theory indicates that when goods are under priced
179

Bianco supra n. 125.
Story from Fishman, supra n. 114.
181
Just under 4 litres.
182
Fishman supra n. 114.
180
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they are over consumed. We need look no further than Wal-Mart to see the truth of this
principle. While Wal-Mart is not the creator of consumerism,183 its dominance creates a
large responsibility to inform consumers about the real costs. By under-pricing, WalMart is misinforming the consumer encouraging over-consumption, and to do so in the
planet’s current state is nothing less than perverse.184 Because of its market dominance, a
strong argument can be made for it bearing considerable corporate responsibility to
inform consumers about costs by pricing correctly.
h) Environmental Costs
The environmental costs imposed by Wal-Mart’s model, alluded to above with respect to
developing nations, are vast both abroad and in the USA.185 Indeed they are certainly so
extensive as to beyond the scope of this particular study. Therefore, only a single
example will be examined. Consider, for example, the matters of packaging and
transport. Wal-Mart requires extensive packaging of goods. Each individual item must
be packaged, and wrapped, placed in boxes, placed on pallets each of which in turn are
wrapped, shipped locally first and then often from overseas. Almost all packaging is
discarded immediately by the consumer as it is largely without benefit, it is often made of
plastics which are in turn made of limited and highly polluting petro-chemicals which
183

Thinking about this can be traced at least as far back as economist Thorstein Vebelen who noted the
efforts of the poor to imitate the consumption patterns of the rich. See David Korten, When Corporations
Rule the World, 2nd ed. (2000) discussion on the creation of consumerism in Western culture. See also,
STEVEN MILES, CONSUMERISM: A WAY OF LIFE (1998), and MATTHEW HILTON, CONSUMERISM IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRITAIN: THE SEARCH FOR A HISTORICAL MOVEMENT (2003). The idea that equates
consumption with happiness comes from economic theory. The principle of unlimited growth being
desirable from an economic perspective see discussion in Kysar, supra n. 2, 29-32. See discussion in
Wolfenden, “Homo economicus: Fantastic fact or factual fantasy?” 1(2) ETHOS-A JOURNAL OF GLOBAL
ETHICS. (1998) The dominance of economic discourse in public policy is becoming a common complaint.
See, for example, Kysar, id. 66 and references therein.
184
See discussion of ecological economics, which is an effort to integrate the seemly obvious fact of
limited planetary resources with economic theory, and the challenges faced in both that project and law and
economics, in Kysar, n. 2.
185
Consider, for example, the recently settled lawsuit United States of America v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc.,
Western Builders Inc. et al, filed in the Western District of Arkansas Fayetteville Division. While this
externality has been caught by the Environmental Protection Agency and settled by a payment of a $1.0
million fine as is accepted in regulatory law there are certainly many others not being caught. In this
instance, the infraction resulted from Wal-Mart’s failure to monitor its contractors in the construction of
new stores. It is interesting to note that Plaintiff alleges in paragraph 8 of the complaint that Wal-Mart is
opening between 100 and 200 new stores annually. Of the 17 infractions in the complaint, 9 give
approximate sizes of the development. The average size of the development is 22 acres. If calculated at
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require the use of other toxic chemicals which have their own environmental and human
health costs. The costs for the manufacture of packaging is openly acknowledged not to
include the true costs.186
Further, it can hardly be argued that the actual environmental costs of burning fossil
fuels—creating greenhouse gases—for the transport over land is factored into the
transportation costs of goods to market. Greenhouse gases already are costing hundreds
of billions of dollars and are increasing exponentially.187 Further, sea-going cargo is
shipped on container vessels that burn the dirtiest fuel produced by refineries. An
average vessel produces emissions that are equivalent to 350,000 automobiles.188 These
environmental costs are not factored into the costs simply because they are not charged to
the vessel operators. The world’s container fleet has increased five fold over the last
twenty years with no world body effectively addressing these issues.189 Of course,
because the analysis in this study has been focused on Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. as a retail
sales corporation, the vast majority of issues related to the manufacture, overconsumption, and disposal of consumed goods has not been addressed.
i) Wal-Mart’s Position
Wal-Mart is not blind to criticism of social costs or the idea of the good corporate citizen.
As it states on its website:

the minimum of 100 stores, Wal-Mart’s expansion amounts to 2,200 acres per year.
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/cwa/walmart.html
186
Even the simple disposal problem associated with packaging has not been adequately resolved, let alone
the pollution caused in its production. Efforts to deal with this are most advanced in the EU with its
Producer Responsibility legislation. Directive 85/339/EEC. Updated report Commission Of The European
Communities, “Proposal For A Directive Of The European Parliament And Of The Council amending
Directive 94/62/EC on packaging and packaging waste.” Brussels, 07.12.2001, COM(2001) 729 final,
2001/0291 (COD) available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/2001/com2001_0729en01.pdf
187
These costs are the reason that the insurance industry has begun lobbying for action against global
warming. Sharon Beder notes that Reinsurers Association of America claims “insurers paid $57 billion for
weather-related losses in the first half of the 1990s compared with $17 billion for the whole of the previous
decade. Sharon Beder, 'Insurers Sweat Over Global Warming', (August 2001) Engineers Australia, 41.
188
Russell Long “Where There's Smoke, There's Pollution,” February 21, 2004, NEW YORK TIMES.
189
The International Maritime Organization, the UN’s body for marine environmental pollution has yet to
consider emissions as a treaty item. Its problems in creating treaties that are effective in controlling marine
environment pollution are great. See discussion in Benedict Sheehy, “Does International Marine
Environment Law Work? An Examination of the Cartagena Convention for The Wider Caribbean Region.”
(Forthcoming) 12(3) GEORGETOWN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW.
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Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. believes each Wal-Mart store, SAM'S CLUB and
distribution center has a responsibility to contribute to the well being of the local
community. Our more than 3,400 locations contributed more than $150 million to
support communities and local non-profit organizations.190
It goes on to describe how the funds are allocated and various recognitions it has received
for its contributions. Do these contributions fulfill its social responsibility, or compensate
fully the community for social costs? Lee Scott, the President and CEO offers “WalMart paid $4 billion in U.S. federal income taxes in fiscal year 2004” which he sees as
another measure of the corporation’s contribution to society.191 But it is difficult to see
why avoiding criminal sanctions for not paying taxes should be seen as contributing to
society. Further, it must be remembered that the tax bill is the absolute minimum that the
corporation could be forced to pay, having been prepared by the most competent and
aggressive tax specialists Wal-Mart could buy.
Business ethicists, who see corporate activity as falling into their domain, note six areas
which can be considered as corporate social costs. They note the effect on the
community, representation of minorities and women, how corporations treat their
employees, environmental protection, foreign stakeholders, and customers.192
Interestingly, in the last five years that Business Ethics Magazine has been auditing and
compiling lists, Wal-Mart despite being the number one corporation in the world in terms
of size, it has never been listed among the 100 most ethical corporations even in the USA.
In other words, it has not matched its size achievement in terms of internalizing its
correlative social costs.193
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“It’s my Wal-Mart” 2004 Annual Report.
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development, see the International Standards Organization’s initial work on corporate Social
Responsibility. Working Report on Social Responsibility, April 30, 2004.
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All of the forgoing leads to the question of the causes or nature of the problem. Clearly,
one cause is the information asymmetry. As noted above, in the pickle sales example, the
goods were being sold at a price that was “incredible.” It is incredible: literally it is not
credible to sell goods at that price, because as we have seen, the actual price is
considerably higher. Quite simply, the price did not factor in all the costs. The
information was not passed on to the people. Where people have the information, there is
evidence to suggest that people prefer not to have those consequences.194
Another aspect to the problem is the focus on wealth creation and in particular, profit
making. Where profit is the sole objective, other abilities, such as broader community
cooperation is diminished or lost.
7) CORPORATE VEHICLE AND SOCIAL COSTS
Wal-Mart is not culpable in either business terms, nor except as identified in the actual,
pending and potential lawsuits, in legal terms.195 Further, it is a darling of the stock
market.196 The question is whether this matter of social costs is a problem resulting from
the corporate form or merely a matter unique to the mega-retail discount giants? If it is
the latter, then it is simply matter of regulation concerning the size of retailers. If it is the
former, it requires further consideration and analysis.
The corporation’s role in this situation is not self-evident. If one accepts the corporation
as a mere nexus-of-contracts, one can escape from the reality of Wal-Mart’s damage
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/info/Conferences/SRConference/pdf/Working%20Report%20on%20SR(Apr30).
pdf
194
There is a considerable consumer and social lobby against Wal-Mart because of the damage it causes to
society. This consumer reaction and the damage caused to communities by Wal-Mart is noted by Stiglitz,
supra, n. 3, 68. See for example, anti-trust lawyer, A. Person’s website, and Al Norman’s work. Further
work is being done in Australia as the damage of big-boxes is becoming known. A search of google.com
produced 1,690 hits for “stop Wal-Mart.” No activist groups attempting to bring Wal-Mart to localities
were found but many opposing it. On the law and economics perspective of the consumer-merchant
information asymmetry and views of regulatory intervention, see Bailey Kuklin “Self-Paternalism in the
Marketplace” 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 649 (1992).
195
Concerns about the legality of its monopolist business strategies and anti-union activities are noted by
U.S.A. lawyer, A. Person on his website www.lawmall.com
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around the world, simply claiming as Easterbrook and Fischel would have it, that it was
all voluntary and therefore not in need of any regulation.197 If one chooses, however, to
acknowledge the reality of the widely disseminated detriment caused to the socioeconomic landscapes in the developed nations and in the third world, which additionally
bears the social costs—namely, the harsh reality faced by the workers in the sweatshops
and the environmental damage created, one can see a very significant role caused by
corporations.
The corporate structure serves as a vehicle for raising funds and coordinating production.
By shielding its participants, investors, directors and other controllers alike from the
consequences of their actions—in this case, their social costs—the corporation makes it
much easier to engage in activities that on a personal level one would find
unacceptable.198
The corporate form permits and encourages the concentration of wealth and power—in
Easterbrook and Fischel’s terms: “[it is] the firm’s strength (its tendency to maximize
wealth).”199 It enables corporate controllers and investors to exploit the weaknesses of
the market for their own advantage, as Easterbrook and Fischel implicitly acknowledge in
their statement: “The task is to establish property rights so that the firm treats the social
costs as private ones, and so that its reactions, as managers try to maximize profits given
these new costs.”200 The weaknesses of the market susceptible to exploitation are those
market failures, noted above, information asymmetry and externalities, which permit the
corporation to benefit without being able to force the corporation to bear the costs. By
creating an entity that is focused exclusively on finance and wealth generation without
concern for the other consequences of its activities, law has created an entity that will
maximize its use of externalities for which it has no liability, in order to maximize its
196

On a scale of 1-5, with 1 being a strong buy recommendation, a sampling of analysts give it a 2. See
analysis on Yahoo Finance pages. http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ao?s=WMT
197
Although society does not condone, or law permit all voluntary transactions. This is the concept of
inalienability in Calabresi & Melamed’s theory of property.
198
This is the problem of role specific ethics and discussed in the ethics literature surrounding corporate
failures and white collar crime.
199
Supra n. 90 at 30.
200
Id at 39.
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internal profits and wealth creation. In the Wal-Mart case study, the strategy of
employing the greatest number of part-time employees without benefits, anti-unionism,
imposition of social costs on China all work to increase profits. These strategies are
implementations of the incentive scheme facilitated by the corporate form.
The corporation facilitates this minimization or externalizing of costs by offering a legal
shield to insiders—the beneficiaries of the corporate form—from the true costs of the
activities from which they intend to profit. In a worst case scenario from the perspective
of insiders, a corporate bankruptcy, neither directors nor officers, nor shareholders, nor
creditors, nor employees will be liable for all the costs created by the corporation where
the corporation has acted in accordance with the law regardless of the quantity or quality
of those costs. In such a worst-case scenario, the corporation acts as a shield and all that
is lost are its assets and share value.
A worst case scenario from the perspective of outsiders, those bearing the social costs, is
not by any means a corporate collapse.201 A corporation which continues to operate,
destroying the environment, poisoning employees, undermining societies is certainly the
worst. In other words, the worst case scenario for society is the opposite of a corporate
collapse-corporate survival.
Furthermore, given the incentive structure in the market, being tied exclusively to profits,
there is no incentive to internalize any costs. In what can only be described as a
perversion of social good, corporate incentives are the exact opposite. To the extent that
a director, officer or manager can externalize a cost and so increase profits, there is a
reward for doing so. Thus with the combination of a structure providing a shield from
consequences and an incentive structure for externalizing negative consequences it
cannot but be supposed that corporations will act in exactly the manner of Wal-Mart.

201

The media attention to corporate collapse cause many to infer that such an event is a worst case
scenario. While a large corporate collapse causes disruption to the economy and to the lives of employees
and suppliers, certainly some of the externalities discussed in this paper are greater concerns.
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Further, with its power over the market and control of information, the corporation will
exploit the information asymmetry between it and other market participants. The
corporation is not required to disclose much about the majority of its activities, and as
seen in the case of Wal-Mart, will tend to be intensely secretive about many of its
activities.202 It does not want competitors to utilize the information to its disadvantage.
More importantly, the corporate form will continue to facilitate profit making when
people do not understand the consequences of its activities. Again, the corporate
structure and the incentives discussed above are designed to support this approach. This
strategy has been employed by big tobacco, automobile manufacturers, and oil
companies. It is as if these latter lessons have not been learned by society; instead
society has accepted continued corporate harm merely instituting a non-smoking
campaign while corporations increase the toxicity of tobacco, accepting automobiles as
status symbols instead of transportation while automobile corporations manufacture more
dangerous and environmentally damaging vehicles (SUV’s, sport Utility Vehicles), and
accepting increased greenhouse emissions as petroleum corporations join in the
promotion of increased burning of fossil fuels by supporting vehicle manufacturers
campaigns for larger vehicles.203
To address the information asymmetry, some scholars have begun advocating triple
bottom line accounting. Whereas the corporate focus on economic results has lead to
exclusive focus on financial reporting, this approach to accounting requires corporations
to provide information on social costs not just monetary profits. While this may well be a
step in the right direction, unless there is a dramatic reform in the economic structure of
the corporation tying such measures to profit they are unlikely to have much effect.204
Furthermore, given the incomplete nature of markets, it will never be possible to account
for all costs in a market regime. Accordingly, for those committed to both a market
economy and accounting for social costs, another mechanism needs to be developed for
attaching cost to benefit, and deducting the former from the latter for purposes of
202

Fishman supra n. 114.
See the connection between the automobile, petroleum industries and related safety matters in Gregg
Easterbrook “The 50-Cent-a-Gallon Solution” 25 May 2004 THE NEW YORK TIMES.
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accurately stating the position of the corporation. As Coase would say, “choosing…
arrangements we should have regards for the total effect.”205 Where such an accounting
has been done, it has led to the conclusion that current economic activity, contrary to the
supposed benefit indicated by ever increasing GDP figures, is in fact a net loss to life on
the planet.206
Another effort to address corporate social costs has been reflected through the Corporate
Social Responsibility movement. This movement’s advocates promote triple-bottom line
accounting, corporate governance and higher levels of personal responsibility. This
recommendation of increased liability where property rights are inappropriate or
ineffective, is in accord with the recommendations of law and economics scholars.207
One example, of this increased liability, it may be argued is the recent Sarbanes-Oxley
legislation, which places the onus on corporate insiders to support the figures presented to
the public, is an effort of just such a sort. The problem with this approach is one not
unique to the problem of social costs or corporate law: it is a problem with law in
general. Law tends to be post facto, fixing things after they have gone wrong. So, where
a corporate insider chooses to support a false statement, such falsehood may not be
discovered until it is too late (as in the case of Enron) and the insider has disappeared
with the profits, or destroyed some aspect of the environment, or created some other
social cost.
While the benevolent view of the market advocated by Adam Smith may have been
appropriate for his day of small entrepreneurs and minimal obvious social costs, the
environmental and social carnage caused by a single corporation like Wal-Mart is beyond
anything he could have imagined, let alone advocated.208 With our increased
understanding of the ecology of the planet and the forces in society, it is inappropriate to
continue to permit corporations with their current structural immunities and perverse
204

Efforts of ethical investment funds or Socially Responsible Investing are an exception, but the size,
coordination and influence of these institutional investors is not known.
205
See supra n. 82.
206
See Kysar, supra, n. 2.
207
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 1090 HARVARD L. REV., April 1972.
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incentive structures to destroy the very thing we humans value most: a thriving society in
a clean environment.

8) CONCLUSION
Sociologist Sharon Zukin has identified the broad-based negative effect of big-box stores.
She opines:
I think stores like Wal-Mart are bad for the world… and bad for the local
communities, because they suck up the buying power without creating the dynamism
for local economies to grow…. Local economies grow on the basis of new products,
growth in production, growth in jobs and lots of local merchants. But with one store
you just don’t get that.209
Her view, which summarizes much of the argument in this article, would lead to the
conclusion that the social costs are overtaking the utility of the neo-classical law and
economics model of the corporation.
To a certain extent, the issue is a coordination problem—the particular type of problem
that faces parties when more than a single value is involved. This type of situation, as
demonstrated above, is not susceptible to a Coasean analysis. It requires collective
action, governmental intervention, and where governments have been co-opted by
corporations, some type of change in corporate legislation to address the issue.
One aspect or cause of coordination problems are the concerns that parties bring to their
everyday concerns and work. As Stiglitz, the former chief economist for the World Bank
observes: “The typical central bank governor begins his day worrying about inflation
statistics, not poverty statistics; the trade minister worries about export numbers, not
pollution indices.”210 In other words, humans tend to focus on the matters under their

208

As Stiglitz observes, Smith himself was aware of market failures. Supra n. 3, 219.
Zukin, supra n. 125.
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immediate control without worrying or making efforts to coordinate their efforts with
others. This natural tendency is particularly worrisome where it effects people at the
centres of power, such as the governors of central banks failing to coordinate with others
in similarly located centres of power, let alone ignoring the ecology which sustains
human life and the economy in the first place. Yet if social costs are not successfully
addressed because of a failure to resolve the coordination problem, the world will become
a much more difficult place to inhabit, at least for the human species. Ironically, the
corporate structure, which is such a significant creator of social costs, facilitates
coordination within itself. It is able to do so because of its single focus on profits and so
suffers to a much lesser degree the coordination problem. The corporation’s strength in
this regard may yet be helpful in solving the problem of social costs where it could be
turned to that end.
Regardless, these problems of coordination and dramatically increasing social costs, it
may make sense to look at corporate law reform. Such reform should follow on our
experience with business, where corporate directors have been granted power on the basis
of financial performance, perhaps directorships of the other important social costs should
be developed. An empowered, informed, incentived, and accountable director of
ecology, for example, sitting on the board of directors, or a similarly created directorship
of labour211 could potentially reduce significantly the related social costs resulting from a
corporation’s profit making activities.
A law and economics approach provides two directives: normatively, that the social costs
of the corporate vehicle must be internalized and positively: that rational self-interested
actors will act only according to their knowledge. Where that knowledge includes social
costs, and where the incentive structure is appropriate, a more effective means of
internalizing externalities and hence minimizing these social costs will lead to
appropriate pricing.212 Appropriate pricing permits the market to appreciate the costs
associated with actions and preferences, and so to make better choices concerning the

211
212

Such as is found in the GmBH in Germany.
Some suggestions are canvassed in my “The Importance of Corporate Models” supra n. 18.
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allocation and use of the planet’s resources. This approach to addressing the market
failure caused by information asymmetry and the corporation’s concerted effort to exploit
consumer ignorance is certainly not an easy agenda; however, given the consequences of
failure to address the issues, continuing current practices is simply not an option.
The larger question of this article has been: How well does the Law and Economics
contractarian model describe the corporate activity and deal with social costs? Our
answer is clearly, not well at all. This suggests further research and the possibility that
working with a concessionaire model may yet be a more successful manner for
addressing the increasingly grave social costs created by corporate activity.
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